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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this project is to identify and trace the impact of conservative
evangelicals' conception of "truth" upon their political tendencies and rhetoric
through the early 1980s. The first chapter of this thesis relies upon several
significant works of scholarship on the roots and coalescence of the religious
Right in order to craft one potential genealogy of conservative evangelicals'
unique and uniquely confident assumption that economic libertarianism and
social conservatism - the distinct threads that combined to mark the "New
Right" - represented both the "American way" and "God's way" at one and the
same time. I argue that historical precedents and regional contexts combined
with this increasingly-coherent political bloc's evangelical religion to bestow
upon their political stances the appearance of incontestable, universally
beneficent absolute truth. In the second chapter, I conduct a close reading of a
book published in 1985 by a Texas couple who were influential in altering
public school textbooks to reflect religious Right ideals. I do so in order to
locate one cause of the appearance of "talking past each other" (an effect that
consistently characterized rhetorical engagements between those on the
religious Right and their opponents) in the authors' conservative evangelical
conception of "truth." Together, these two papers highlight some of the
problems arising from the common assumption that religion and theology are
extricable from politics. Finally, the essays contained in this thesis point to
ways in which accounting for the theology of particular religious groups can
contribute to a fuller understanding of those groups, their development, and
their social and historical impact.
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Preface
“Reagan’s overwhelming victory” in 1980, claims Bethany Moreton in To
Serve God and Weil-Mart: The Making of Christian Free Enterprise, “and the
growth of his evangelical base forced a sea change in the political and cultural
landscape, moving the right from marginal fringe to controlling center.”1 However
many scholars debate the extent to which the “right” ever qualified as a “marginal
fringe,” a great number of scholars of twentieth century conservatism have, like
Moreton, accepted the 1980 presidential election’s significance as axiomatic. The
date continues to function either as a marker for a “sea change” in American
political and social history, as Moreton puts it, or as a symbolic point of departure
for investigating the causes and effects of that change. The explanations for the
broad cultural and political shifts that occurred as part of the “Reagan Era” have
become more complicated over time. The floods of initial and somewhatpanicked cries of localized right-wing conspiracies have largely given way to the
assertion more common today, that (as Moreton herself argues) whatever the
degree of conservative political organization that existed at the dawn of the
decade, all that 1980 symbolizes was in actuality a long time in coming.
In the first half of this thesis, I review several monographs that trace a
variety of quite complicated pasts behind the conservative resurgence in the
1980s. The works I include contribute, at least in part, to an explanation of the
origins and successes of the political phenomenon now labeled the “religious

1 Bethany Moreton, To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian
Free Enterprise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 4.
l

Right” (which many in 1980 did not yet distinguish from the broader “New Right”),
and that phenomenon’s largest demographic - conservative evangelicals. My
goal in examining this literature is to propose one possible genealogy of the
fusion of evangelical religion, conservative politics, and nationalism that marked
1980 as a point of departure from the more liberal trends of prior decades. More
specifically, I aim to highlight some of the factors that played a key part in
normalizing that fusion within conservative evangelical communities themselves.
I suggest that recent scholarship on the religious Right points towards the ways
in which conservative evangelicals from the early part of the twentieth century to
the early 1980s internalized particular economic and social ideas, conflating both
those ideas and their religious beliefs with their own American “imagined
community.”2 My literature review affirms the notion that conservative
evangelicals within the religious Right demonstrate a conundrum unique to the
American experience, in part because of the common and peculiarly American
assumption that an individual’s “religion” can and ought to exist as a distinct and
more importantly discreet entity, but also because of the way in which
conservative evangelicals and their predecessors have historically tended to act
in direct opposition to that assumption. Indeed, as the books reviewed highlight,
2 1borrow here from Benedict Anderson’s terminology. The nation,
according to Anderson, is “an imagined political community... It is imagined
because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives
the image of their communion... Finally, it is imagined as a community, because,
regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the
nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.” Imagined
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 3rd ed. (New
York: Verso, 2006), 6-7.
2

conservative evangelicals have tended to bestow upon their political ideals and
their nationalistic fervor the weight of their belief, rooted in their evangelical faith,
in their possession of absolute truth.
The second portion of this thesis centers on a 1985 book, What Are They
Teaching Our Children?, written by Mel and Norma Gabler, a Texas couple
passionate about correcting what they perceived to be the tragic disintegration of
a “Christian America,” disintegration resulting from what they strongly felt were
immoral public school textbooks. I rely heavily on the literary technique of close
reading to conduct an examination of their rhetoric. I do this to explore the ways
in which an examination of that rhetoric contributes toward a deeper
understanding of the reasons why the appearance of talking past one another
characterizes much of the political debate surrounding and involving conservative
evangelicals in the 1980s and onward. In light of the history of insisting upon a
separation of church affairs from state ones (however incompletely that ideal has
ever been enacted), and in part because of the nature of debate (meaning, at its
most broad, communication intended to persuade), the Gablers’ work can be
read as an effort to “translate” the concerns of deeply-religious people into terms
that could be persuasive both to those who shared the Gablers’ faith and to those
who did not. On a rhetorical level, at least, their attempt singularly fails. Their
attempts to use what Jurgen Habermas has called “generically accessible
language” merely masks the fact that they are not interested in crafting
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“generically accessible” presuppositions.3 Thus, while they frequently argue in
terms that appear “generically accessible,” their foundational premises, rooted in
the conservative evangelical theological tradition, remain largely
unacknowledged. The effect is a work that, to all but those who share that
theological tradition, appears incoherent and self-contradictory.
This project as a whole then reinforces the now-prevalent observation that
the separation of religion from state processes and institutions - the supposed
division between “church and state” - has been throughout United States history
a mostly rhetorical dualism, a distinction that has in fact rarely (if ever) been
lived.4 Indeed, as Sarah Rivett eloquently and persuasively argues in The
Science of the Soul in Colonial New England, the wide acceptance of a “natural”
separation between religious and empirical ways of knowing is a recent
development.5 As law and religion scholar Winnifred Sullivan points out in The
Impossibility of Religious Freedom, this epistemological division occurred in

3 Jurgen Habermas, “The Political’: The Rational Meaning of a
Questionable Inheritance of Political Theology,” in The Power of Religion in the
Public Sphere, ed. Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan VanAntwerpen (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2011), 26.
4 See Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2002), for one example. Hamburger suggests that
“separation of church and state” was an ideal crafted retrospectively and not, as
is so often assumed, embedded in the U.S. Constitution.
5 Indeed, Rivett argues that through the mid-eighteenth century, the notion
that there was or ought to be a distinction between scientific and spiritual
knowledge was not at all widely accepted. “Inductive reasoning,” Rivett writes,
“recourse to discoveries, the compilation of data, and the testing of a scientific
theory through experiment were among the new measurements applied to
metaphysics and spiritual study,” in the Puritans’ hunt for “evidence of God on
human souls.” Sarah Rivett, The Science of the Soul in Colonial New England
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 5.
4

conjunction with “religious freedom and the legal disestablishment of religion, as
political ideas, [which] find their origin in the early modern period of Europe.”6
The attempts throughout United States history to compartmentalize religion (or at
least, non-dominant religion), however, have created perpetual problems, not the
least of which is the problem of defining religion. As Sullivan argues, “in order to
enforce laws guaranteeing religious freedom you must first have religion.”7
“Defining religion,” however, “is very difficult,” something Sullivan argues law
really cannot do without undermining the very religious freedom it ostensibly
protects.8 As she observes and as my examination of current scholarship affirms,
“Ordinary religion, that is, the disestablished religion of ordinary people, fits
uneasily into the spaces allowed for religion in the public square and in the
courtroom.”9
Sullivan argues that “the precondition for political participation by religion
increasingly became cooperation with liberal theories and forms of
governance.”10 The problem lies in the fact that such cooperation necessarily
requires “religion” be subordinate or adaptable to the values liberal government
requires, terms unacceptable to those whose religious beliefs must by their very
definition take priority over and inform all other demands. Furthermore, by the
1980s, the “theories and forms of governance” in the United States had shifted
6 Winnifred Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2007), 7.
7 Ibid., 1.
8 Ibid., 1.
9 Ibid., 138.
10 Ibid., 7.
5

toward an increased acceptance of many forms of diversity. Furthermore, many
citizens, including leaders in public education and national media outlets,
affirmed the idea that a pluralistic society is a positive good. As Giovanni Sartori
argues persuasively, however, that presumption is itself a “value-belief.”11 “That
difference (and .not uniformity), dissent (and not unanimity), change (and not
immutability) are ‘good things,’” Sartori explains, “-the se are the value-beliefs
that properly belong to the cultural context of pluralism and that a pluralistic
culture should convey in order to be true to its name.”12 Many conservative
evangelicals on the religious Right were like the Gablers - eager to participate in
the political process but finding the growing emphasis on “pluralism” antithetical
to their deepest moral instincts. Sartori claims that “pluralism... cannot be said to
exist until the realm of God and the realm of Caesar are divided. This entails that
no total claim is legitimate,” or, I would qualify, can at least be legitimately
imposed upon a non-consenting population.13 What the Gablers’ rhetoric
suggests first is that this Texas couple was quite aware that they lived in a
diverse society whose members were likely to take issue not merely with their
specific aims but with their core premises. The Gablers’ recognition of the
existence of diversity seems to have compelled them to attempt to communicate
their agenda in terms that would not appear religiously partisan. The problem lay
in the fact that the terminology did not alter the Gablers’ driving presuppositions,
11 Giovanni Sartori, "Understanding Pluralism." Journal of Democracy 8.
no. 4 (1997): 62, http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.wm.edu/journals/journal_of
_democracy/v008/8.4sartori.html (accessed June 26, 2013).
12 Ibid., 62.
13 Ibid., 63.
6

assumptions rooted in their unique worldview and which were in direct conflict
with the notion upon which the peaceful perpetuation of a pluralistic society rests
- that “no total claim is legitimate.” This notion was for the Gablers and numerous
others on the religious Right untenable, for one of the beliefs most basic to the
conservative evangelical tradition is the assertion that there is one true, totalizing
metanarrative, and it is in believers’ possession.
As noted earlier, Jurgen Habermas suggests that “religious language”
ought to be allowed “in the public sphere,” but citizens who choose to use that
religious language “have to accept that the potential truth contents of religious
utterances must be translated into a generically accessible language before they
can find their way onto the agendas of parliaments, courts, or administrative
bodies and influence their decisions.”14 What I argue throughout my work on the
Gablers is that this “translation” process is precisely what they, and many others
on the religious Right, tried to do. The problem is one that Charles Taylor
identifies in his reading of political philosopher John Rawls: “Religious languages
operate outside this discourse [of secular reason] by introducing extraneous
premises that only believers can accept;” Rawls’ solution, according to Taylor,
was to have everyone “talk the common language.”15 Yet Taylor rejects both
Rawls’ call for a “common language” as well Habermas’ proposition that religious
ideas can be used in the “public sphere” but must translated into a common

14 Habermas, “Political Theology,” 25-26.
15 Charles Taylor, “Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism,” in
The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, ed. Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan
VanAntwerpen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 49.
7

language prior to broad enforcement. Instead, the common “distinction in rational
credibility between religious and nonreligious discourse,” a belief stemming from
an “understanding of the Enlightenment” and its categorical split between reason
and faith “as an absolute, unmitigated step forward,” is, Taylor argues, “utterly
without foundation.”16 Religious reasoning is, according to Taylor and as I
suggest in my study of the Gablers’ rhetoric, quite rational in its own way. But I
also argue that “in its own way” is an important caveat. Habermas presumes the
“truth content” of religiously-based reasoning is somehow “translatable” into a
“common language.” Taylor insists that there should be little need for such
translation. I suggest that perhaps in particular cases such translation, even
when it is attempted, remains singularly ineffective because of the untranslatable
premises undergirding the logic of particular arguments, including those that the
Gablers make in What Are They Teaching Our Children? Together, the papers
that comprise this thesis suggest that debates within a pluralistic democracy will
proceed productively only if participants acknowledge both the historical twists
and turns involved in the ways certain groups’ ideas and beliefs develop, and if
participants correctly and clearly identify which presuppositions are being
accepted a priori, and which are the source of the disagreement.

16 Ibid., 53.
8

Chapter 1: Towards a Genealogy of the Conflation of Christian and
American Identity
I.

Introduction

Who owns “America”? This question is rarely asked pointedly. It
nevertheless lies at the heart of many of the most heated debates over
citizenship and political participation since the time that there were any “United
States” to discuss. More useful for intellectual investigation, perhaps, is the
following question: what can we learn from those who claim to own “America”? I
must first make clear that I use the term America” not to refer to any
geographical area within the political boundaries of the United States, however
contested those boundaries have been and continue to be. Nor am I referring to
the larger western hemisphere, in which region every nation arguably has a
rightful claim to the term. Rather, I am referring to “America” as a word deployed
in an effort to delimit the behaviors and qualities of an ideal citizenry, a sign
hailed most often in efforts to exclude those with an alternate ideal. While
throughout United States history, racial, class-based and gendered limitations
have been drawn and redrawn in order to variously expand or restrict citizenship,
religion, too, has played a consistent critical part in marking the boundaries
around what and who count as “American.”
For much of the twentieth century, and particularly since the beginning of
the Cold War, conservative evangelical Protestants have been among those
groups to most vocally assert themselves as the true defenders (and their

9

morality as the truest foundation) of the ideals comprising their “America.”17 Their
efforts to fashion a “Christian America” have recurred with such visible frequency
that there is an illusion of necessity regarding the connection between their
religion and their politics. Michel Foucault’s essay, “Nietzsche, Genealogy,
History,” provides an important corrective to such a view: “What is found at the
historical beginning of things,” Foucault insists, “is not the inviolable identity of
their origin; it is the dissension of other things. It is disparity.”18 Taking Foucault’s
words to heart enables us to recognize that however easy it is to conflate
“Christianity” and right-wing nationalism - however consistently conservative
evangelicals have conflated the two themselves - the two can exist and have
existed independent of each other. There is no logical (or theological) necessity
for an affinity between the two, no “inviolable identity of their origin.” Throughout

171use the term “conservative evangelical” as the least cumbersome
method of speaking of a theologically-nuanced group that includes selfproclaimed fundamentalists (such as Jerry Falwell), those whom Margaret
Bendroth in Fundamentalism and Gender. 1875 to the Present (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1993) terms “neo-evangelicals” (such as Billy Graham), as well
as Pentecostals. The “conservative” label indicates the highly critical stance
toward the American moral climate and a close alliance with conservative
political policies, as opposed to other “progressive” evangelicals, such as Jim
Wallis, who have claimed the “evangelical” label but have taken a markedly
different approach toward social justice issues in particular. The “evangelical”
label indicates the theological similarities each of these groups has historically
shared. In David Bebbington’s terms, there are four core components of the
evangelical tradition that continue to persist: “conversionism, the belief that lives
need to be changed; activism, the expression of the gospel in effort; biblicism, a
particular regard for the Bible; and... crucicentrism, a stress on the sacrifice of
Christ on the cross.” Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s
to the 1980s, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 3.
18 Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Language,
Counter-Memory, Practice, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1977), 142.
10

history, of course, a proclaimed commitment to Christianity and a commitment to
national interests have quite often been in the service of one another, but each
particular conflation has a genealogy, and conservative evangelicals’ claims to
the right to define “America” are no exception.
By the 1980s, a brand of conservative politics that had evolved to
incorporate both economic libertarianism and social conservatism had become
rhetorically fused with the brand of Christianity associated with conservative
evangelicals. To outsiders, this fusion has persistently been perceived as illogical
and anti-historical at best and manipulative or hypocritical at worst. To those on
the inside, the “natural” connection between the component parts of this fusion
has been understood as quite simply obvious, a-historical common sense. The
fact that so many conservative evangelicals have spoken and continue to speak
of nationalism and conservative politics as if they were an integral part of a
unified, universal Christian belief system, while also demanding that their
particular religious belief system be considered a necessary part of a true
patriot’s identity is a fact that needs to be studied in light of the knowledge that
this fusion has a genealogy.
These combinations became naturalized quite quickly within conservative
evangelical communities. Yet answering how they became normative for so
many and then, importantly, rearticulated as normative, even by conservative
evangelicals who are not politically active, remains a question answered only in
bits and pieces as of yet. While this matter demands much more intensive
scholarship, each of the books examined in this paper more or less obliquely
11

make insightful and important suggestions. David Sehat’s The Myth of American
Religious Freedom makes it clear that the United States has had a long history of
using a moral code rooted in a Protestant worldview to determine the
qualifications for citizenship, granting a historical precedent for conservative
evangelicals’ claim that Protestant morality (albeit their own sense of it) should
be upheld as the nation’s moral code. Jonathan Herzog’s The Spiritual-Industrial
Complex: America’s Religious Battle against Communism in the Early Cold War
examines the ways in which intellectual, theological, and political elites in the
early years of the Cold War self-consciously shaped and deployed a generically
“Judeo-Christian” religion to combat the threat of Communism. This temporarilyexplicit official endorsement of religion laid the groundwork for many of the
presuppositions off of which the religious Right would operate, including
providing its members with an identifiable point-in-time to mark the beginning of
America’s spiritual degeneration. Susan Friend Harding’s The Book of Jerry
Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and Politics describes a unique discourse,
rooted in the language of the Bible, that masks ideological tension and elides
historical change, creating the illusion of stability and eternal “truth” that appears
obviously true for those who accept presuppositions regarding the Protestant
Bible’s inerrant, literal nature and typological function. With the efforts of Moral
Majority founder Jerry Falwell in particular, this discourse evolved to incorporate
once-divided factions of conservative evangelicals into a unified, broader group,
uniting their expanding array of conservative political causes and bestowing upon
political efforts the same appearance of moral indisputability granted the Bible.
12

Bethany Moreton’s To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian Free
Enterprise and Ruth Murray Brown’s For a “Christian America”: A History of the
Religious Right both focus on the development of key religious Right ideas within
the context of “Wal-Mart Country,” the southern states west of the Mississippi.
Together their work suggests the way a wide array of regionally-rooted concerns
and cultural norms - from free enterprise to patriarchal gender roles - came to
be perceived and articulated as essential components of the “Christian America”
that was the “true” America. Lisa McGirr’s Suburban Warriors: Origins of the New
American Right and Darren Dochuk’s From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain-Folk
Religion. Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Conservative Evangelicalism help
explain the expansion of regionally-rooted movements to a nationally-recognized
political bloc by looking at the changing dynamics in southern California over the
decades surrounding and following World War Two. Together, the books
reviewed in this paper suggest the ways in which an awareness of the historical
privileging of a Protestant moral order, both culturally and institutionally, and an
existing civil-religious rhetoric melding God and country were themselves
assimilated into a conservative evangelical discourse. This was a language that
weighted every endeavor with spiritual significance, simultaneously masking
tensions between core ideological components of the larger New Right’s platform
and eliding a history that exposed such tensions. For conservative evangelicals
within the religious Right in both its nascence and its maturity, these factors
worked.together to inspire and legitimate their claims to represent America’s true
heritage, making the inseparability of nationalism, right wing politics, and
13

conservative evangelical faith appear to them to be a historical fact, an
indisputable truth, and an obvious good.
II.

The Persistence of Protestant Hegemony

A particularly Protestant articulation of American identity - what the social
mores that define that identity are, and what they ought to be - has a history as
old as the United States itself. In The Myth of American Religious Freedom.
David Sehat explores this history. His book is a project arguing for the persistent
failure of the United States’ political and legal systems to guarantee what is often
touted as the central American ideal - religious freedom. The existence of
religious freedom in the United States is, he argues, a myth, and one that
“wither[s] under scrutiny.”19 Regardless of how often the United States’ founding
documents are cited by both sides of the aisle as the legal basis for a long
standing tradition of religious freedom, and despite the fact that a handful
(although by no means the oft-assumed consensus) of far-seeing Founding
Fathers did push for a definitive separation of church and state, “the U.S.
Constitution and the First Amendment did not create the separation that [men
like] Madison and Jefferson advocated.”20 While the Constitution proclaimed this
separation on a federal level, at the state and local levels such separation rarely
occurred, and was in fact often deliberately resisted. Furthermore, the governing
white male elite considered this Protestant morality to be normative and not
religious - regardless of how often marginalized religious groups protested both
19 David Sehat, The Myth of American Religious Freedom (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 3.
20 Ibid., 5.
14

assertions. Sehat asserts the existence, then, of what he terms a “moral
establishment,” which he defines as a persistent bias toward a Protestant moral
ethic in political and legal practice, aided and abetted by the individual states’
power and by the ambiguity of the First Amendment’s language.21
Sehat’s notion of a “moral establishment” resembles quite closely the idea
of cultural hegemony - “that part of a dominant worldview which has been
naturalized” - that anthropologists Jean and John Comaroff describe.22
Interestingly, Sehat himself does not, at least explicitly, discuss the heuristic
benefits of the concept of hegemony at all, and as a result his efforts “to get at
something” like a “moral establishment” that is “so misty and yet persistent” fall
short, keeping his explanations of its character and consequence a bit “mistier”
than they need to be.23 The numerous and almost constant legal challenges that
non-Protestant groups brought against the moral establishment, Sehat argues,
were not enough to depose it, for the issue was not merely or even primarily a
—<

21 “Principles of federalism gave the states an enormous reservoir of
power to regulate the health, welfare, and morals of its residents, and religious
partisans drew from this source to imprint their moral ideals onto state
constitutions and judicial opinions. Supporters claimed that a religiously derived
morality, enforceable by law, was essential to the health of the state... This
connection between Protestant Christianity’s moral code and state power was
commonplace throughout much of U.S. history.” Ibid., 5.
22 Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution:
Christianity. Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa, vol. 1 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991), 25. The Comaroffs, pulling from the work of
both Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci and French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu,
provide a clear and useful definition of hegemony: “We take hegemony to refer to
that order of signs and practices, relations and distinctions, images and
epistemologies - drawn from a historically situated cultural field - that come to be
taken-for-granted as the natural and received shape of the world and everything
that inhabits it.” Ibid., 23.
23 Sehat, Mvth. 9.
15

legal one. The problem lay, he quite accurately asserts, in the pervasive
presence of a mostly unconscious bias toward a particular religion’s moral code
that lay at the heart of the dominant definition of what counted as “American” essentially the affirmation of Protestant hegemony. Sehat acknowledges that for
centuries, the idea that countries depended on legally-enforceable morality for
their very survival was a commonplace. But as he makes clear, what most of
those in the United States who wielded political and legal authority could not
recognize (a blindness also reflected in widespread popular opinion, up through
the middle of the twentieth century, at least) was the religiously-partisan nature of
the definition of the supposedly a-religious “morality” that they were enforcing.
Theories of hegemony go much further than theories privileging willful blindness
toward explaining the persistence of such blindness in the face of consistent
opposition. “Hegemony, at its most effective, is mute,” and those who are within it
are within it precisely because its presence and power is invisible to them.24
The theory of hegemony that the Comaroffs espouse also helps explain
why it was not until other cultural trends began broadly undermining the authority
of religion in general that the “moral establishment” faced its first serious threats.
Through explorations of the experience of religious dissenters (from early
Baptists to the internally-divided abolition movement, from women’s rights
advocates to the often-hounded atheists, “freethinkers,” and Catholics of the end
of the nineteenth century), Sehat describes how the confrontations between
these groups and the states’ legal and political apparatuses illuminated, however
24 Comaroff and Comaroff, Of Revelation. 24.
16

briefly, the otherwise “shadowy character of the moral establishment.”25 Tellingly,
however, he argues that it was not until the widening division between science
and religion in the university, the social upheaval and new moral dilemmas posed
by industrialism and corporate capitalism, and the falling-out between liberal
Protestants and fundamentalists, that the existence of this “moral establishment”
became visible to the dominant white male elites themselves, increasingly legible
to them as religiously partisan. In the theory of hegemony the Comaroffs
articulate, “once [hegemony’s] internal contradictions are revealed, when what
seemed natural comes to be negotiable, when the ineffable is put into words then hegemony becomes something other than itself. It turns into ideology and
counterideology.” 26 It is at this point that resistance to an erstwhile hegemony but
still-dominant ideology can effect significant change.
Nonetheless, “it is, more often than not, a very long road from the dawning
of an antihegemonic consciousness to an ideological struggle won.”27 Sehat’s
failure to utilize theories of hegemony lies at the root of his uncertainty about the
status of the moral establishment now. At one point, he refers to the 1973
decision in Roe v. Wade as the “death knell for the moral establishment,” but his

25 Sehat, Myth, 9.
26 The Comaroffs distinguish hegemony from ideology as follows:
“Whereas the first consists of constructs and conventions that have come to be
shared and naturalized throughout a political community, the second is the
expression and ultimately the possession of a particular social group, although it
may be widely peddled beyond. The first is nonnegotiable and therefore beyond
direct argument; the second is more susceptible to being perceived as a matter
of inimical opinion and interest and therefore is open to contestation. Hegemony
homogenizes, ideology articulates.” Of Revelation. 24.
27 Ibid., 26.
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further discussion of the emergence of the religious Right and the political
success of religious conservatives in the 2000s suggests that this moral
establishment persists in some form with a vitality and tenacity that is unlikely to
disappear.28 His assertion of the moral establishment’s “ultimate dismantling”
seems contradictory in light of the fact that a moment later he insists that, “When
the moral establishment went into decline, the religious Right mobilized to restore
it, leaving us where we are today.”29 The Comaroffs’ theory sheds light on this
puzzle. Hegemony, “always intrinsically unstable, always vulnerable” according
to them, morphs into ideology that, as it is articulated and therefore made open to
debate, makes it possible for both components of cultural domination to give
“way to an ever more acute, articulate resistance,” and a proceeding counterresistance.

Of)

It should not be unexpected, then, in light of Sehat’s work, that as
American culture has become more pluralistic and (in general) more comfortable
with religious diversity, certain Protestant communities with whom that longdominant moral code continues to resonate should attempt to claim the role of
defenders of the Protestant moral order - in their minds, the “true” American way.
Whatever its shortcomings, Sehat’s work offers the profound insight that
conservative evangelicals who argued (and still do) that Protestant morality
should be equated with “true Americanism” have historical precedent to back
them. Whether or not Protestant morality (defined in selective ways) should be so
28 Sehat, Myth. 263.
29 Ibid., 8.
30 Comaroff and Comaroff, Of Revelation. 26-27.
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equated with “true Americanism” is debatable, of course, and as Sehat makes
clear, that question was debated from the beginning, and with increased
consequence throughout the twentieth century. Understanding Sehat’s “moral
establishment” as a kind of Protestant hegemony helps articulate what he
struggles to explain - the persistence of structural, institutional, and cultural
biases toward Protestant morality; the explicitly partisan nature of the religious
Right’s efforts to once again make a Protestant morality the unspoken boundary
between those within “America” and those without; and the effectiveness of
efforts to contain such re-hegemonizing campaigns by perpetuating the debate
over the answer to the question, “Who owns America?” rather than settling any
single answer.
III.

The Religious Rhetoric of Early Cold War Nationalism

Jonathan Herzog claims in The Spiritual-Industrial Complex: America’s
Religious Battle against Communism in the Early Cold War that not long after the
close of World War Two, a nation-wide “revival” was in the works.31 “Of course,”
Herzog acknowledges, revival itself “was nothing new. Religious leaders had
long called for revival in times of trial and triumph. What made the early Cold War
different was the degree to which other, secular institutions had reached the
same conclusion.”32 Herzog exposes the deliberateness with which national and
local political and cultural leaders linked American nationalism to a generic but

31 Jonathan P. Herzog, The Spiritual-Industrial Complex: America’s
Religious Battle against Communism in the Early Cold War (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 70.
32 Ibid., 70.
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explicit “Judeo-Christian” religious affiliation and expression. What began as a
primarily intellectual discussion following the Russian Revolution developed into
the “spiritual-industrial complex,” encompassing a range of institutional and
organizational efforts to foster faith and draw a sharp line between “America” and
“communism.” This multi-pronged but temporary effort is another thread that
bolstered conservative evangelicals’ self-assured claim that their own version of
“Christian Americanism” represented the “true America.” However short-lived
official efforts to uphold claims to America’s “(Judeo-)Christian-ness” were, those
efforts granted the appearance of official legitimacy (to those primed to see it as
such) to conservative evangelicals’ claims over the next several decades that
America was indeed and, more importantly, ought to be a “Christian nation.”
Equating people’s “American-ness” with their explicit (however vague)
Judeo-Christian affiliation was an equivalency forged amidst the pressures upon
national political leaders following World War Two to firmly demarcate between
the United States and the stubbornly-amorphous nemesis, “communism.” The
evolution of this equation between Judeo-Christian faith and American-ness
originated primarily, according to Herzog, amidst conversations between
intellectuals and theologians in the 1920s and 1930s who argued for
understanding communism as a kind of religious rival to the “Judeo-Christian”
tradition. These conversations occurred in tandem with evidence from various
censuses and surveys suggesting a significant decline in religious practice
throughout the American middle class as well as the clear signs of a growing
d/srespect for the religion of the middle class among the media and
20

intellectuals.33 Thus, Herzog suggests that perhaps the key reason the Cold War
conflict so quickly took on the shape of a “holy war” is because what began as a
discussion among the American intelligentsia defining communism “as a rival
faith” antithetical “to Judeo-Christianity” was picked up by powerful political
leaders post-World War Two who were managing a conflict in desperate need of
clarification.34 If “displacing God as the center of morality” would, in the logic of
the day, inevitably lead to communism, and if the secularizing trends that
scholars and journalists among others were observing had indeed begun to
affect that displacement, the urgent argument that “Americans had to fight faith
with faith” might indeed appear well-founded.35 Attuned to the logic developed by
intellectual and theological elites, national leaders began a “joint effort of
government, business, educators, the media, and others” to rally the people to
belief in God, in order to wield the weapon of religion against America’s
ambiguous and atheistic new enemy, communism.36
Herzog, in his close attention to the decade following World War Two,
does not fully examine the implications of what Sehat makes clear: the belief that
33 Herzog argues that the existence of a widespread impression of
secularization operated perhaps even more powerfully than however real that
widespread secularization actually was, for “more Americans received
information from the media than ever before, and the information they obtained
increasingly minimized and assailed the authority of American religion.” As he
further explains later on, “Few had the time, ability, and interest to read the everexpanding corpus of Communist treatises, so the task of defining Communism
for public and political consumption fell to a relatively small group of scholars,
journalists, religious leaders, politicians, and Communists themselves.” SpiritualIndustrial Complex. 22 and 45.
34 Ibid., 45.
35 Ibid., 51.
36 Ibid., 178.
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“the success of any nation was tied intimately to a moral culture, incubated and
guarded by religion” and official enforcement of that belief were not new,
however novel the efforts to make that argument on the federal level were.37
Sehat describes the way in which religiously-rooted morality gained hegemonic
force through people’s refusal or inability to recognize those religious roots.
Herzog, in agreement with Sehat, acknowledges that the rhetorical and
ideological materials with which this equation could be made were themselves in
existence long before the Cold War. Thus, insisting that Americans were by
definition “Judeo-Christian” could appear, even to politicians, to be far more
genuine than a mere political ploy - a description of reality, in fact. Thus, the fact
that leaders found somewhat intuitive the need to call for and implement a
“Judeo-Christian” affiliation as a requirement for full citizenship in the 1950s
suggests that the reason such a move could gain even the temporary credibility it
did has much to do with Sehat’s longstanding “moral establishment,” newly
visible and now deployed in explicit and powerful ways.
Naming, though, also fractures, creating apertures through which
alternative definitions and explanations can be advanced. Winnifred Sullivan
argues in her case study of court efforts to enforce religious freedom that “in
order to enforce laws guaranteeing religious freedom you must first have
religion.”38 “Defining religion,” however, “is difficult,” perpetuating debates over

37 Ibid., 78.
38 Sullivan, Impossibility. 1.
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whose “religion” qualifies as such.39 The spiritual-industrial complex Herzog
describes was a highly organized, multi-pronged attempt to do exactly that define religion in an effort to clarify the limits of citizenship. For at least the
decade-and-a-half on which Herzog focuses, a great range of people did indeed
accept the “faith” of “Christian Americanism”- willingly or begrudgingly - as a
truism and mark of citizenship. Yet this top-down infusion of religion into
nationalism through institutional channels worked on a large and general scale
for a short time only, until the beginning of John F. Kennedy’s presidency.40
Representing the Cold War as a battle between “faiths” ultimately exposed the
limits and contradictions of state-guided spirituality in a nation whose constitution
famously proclaimed religious freedom. The spiritual-industrial complex became
further evidence of the excesses of the McCarthy era, prompting dissenters to
offer alternative definitions both of religion and the qualifications for citizenship.
By the 1960s, voices were crying persuasively for the “reprivatization of
spirituality.”41 As Herzog suggests, “The usefulness of religion in the Cold War
was not self-evident to most Americans; they needed direction. So too did
sacralization require more than the words of religious leaders. Sacralization

39 Ibid., 1.
40 “The Cold War, now fifteen years old, had not produced the sweeping
domestic conversions to the Communist faith that had concerned J. Edgar
Hoover, Tom C. Clark, or Claire Boothe Luce. The uncertainty and speculation
once at the forefront of American consciousness had diminished. There were fits
of anxiety still to come, but the kind of Communist infiltration depicted
metaphorically in cinematic romps like Invasion of the Body Snatchers seemed
an ever fainter possibility.” Herzog, Spiritual-Industrial Complex, 185.
41 Ibid.,188.
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required consensus. And as that consensus began to disintegrate, so too would
its spiritual fruits.”42
However hazily-outlined Herzog’s “consensus” is, he nonetheless
illuminates our understanding of “Christian Americanism” in its later twentieth
century manifestations by insisting that at least some people continued to believe
in the existence of that consensus, and more importantly in the need to maintain
it: “By the late 1950s, conservative religious leaders had picked up the drooping
banner of religious anti-Communism and were carrying it in their own crusade.”43
Indeed, the “religious arguments marshaled against Communism during the
1950s provided a platform from which both modern religious and political
conservatism grew.”44 This “holy war that once concerned all religious
Americans,” from Catholics to liberal and mainstream Protestants, had become
“the province, and indeed the obsession, of a fraction of them.”45 The organizers
of the “spiritual-industrial complex” had intended it to be a largely ecumenical
affair (within “Judeo-Christian” bounds, of course). Yet the heritage of Protestant
privilege and the very generic nature of the rhetoric, it could be argued, made it
easier for this unique Cold-War tactic to appear like confirmation that the
government was merely upholding a particularly Protestant Christianity as
American once more. Furthermore, this “spiritual-industrial complex” birthed “a
tautology used by the opponents of secularism in future decades...: America

42 Ibid.,
43 Ibid.,
44 Ibid.,
45 Ibid.,
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employed these expressions [entwining nationalism with religion] because it was
religious, and America was religious because it employed these expressions.
Sacralization had become a self-justifying endeavor.”46 Herzog demonstrates
convincingly that in his particular case, “the process by which religious faith has
been fused with popular conceptions of Americanism was not brought about by
some movement of destiny’s hand.”47 He argues that “for millions constantly
bombarded with the message that the religious could not be Communists, it was
a short logical step to the authoritative axiom that the irreligious could not be true
Americans.”48 A centuries-old history of Protestant privilege made this “logic”
immensely easier, and it resonated with those groups inclined to perceive and
interpret all experience through a religious lens.
IV.

The Impact of Bible-Based Discourse

Like Sehat, Herzog’s focus is not on religious communities or groups, but
*

rather on the way in which language and ideas rooted in particular religious
traditions became entwined with supposedly non-religious institutions. Thus,
rather than focusing on the ways in which religious groups incorporate and
deploy nationalistic rhetoric - the issue that I wish to explore - Herzog looks at
the ways in which in which “other, more unlikely, institutions” such as the media,
higher education, and various arms of the federal government became, in the
first decade of the Cold War, “the greatest advocates of religion’s importance to

46 Ibid., 186.
47 Ibid., 12.
48 Ibid.
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American society.”49 Herzog’s work nevertheless provides critical insight into the
reverse conundrum. While he makes it clear that to many within the state and
civic structures employing “spiritual” rhetoric, “God” and “faith” were deliberately
vague and ambiguous terms intended to encompass a broad group of people,
groups such as conservative evangelicals consistently found, in those terms
already familiar to them, a much narrower meaning, and thus a much narrower
definition of “America.” Many citizens came to be convinced that the socially and
economically conservative political package increasingly claimed by adherents to
a political “New Right” was simultaneously God’s way and the American way. To
understand how this process worked, we must look carefully at the unique
“language” conservative evangelicals often speak, a language that according to
anthropologist Susan Harding, is a Bible-based discourse whose primacy over
other discourses tends to translate - to powerful effect - many otherwise nonreligiously grounded ideas into its own terms.
In The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and Politics.
Harding provides profound insight into understanding the means by which
conservative evangelicals have come to accept “Christian Americanism” as an
indisputable truth. The nucleus of Harding’s work is based on her observations
throughout the 1980s of Virginian fundamentalist and Moral Majority founder
Jerry Falwell and his community of followers. She conducts lengthy exegeses of
Jerry Falwell’s sermons and his organizations’ various publications, as well as of
the political rhetoric he and his organizations developed surrounding certain key
49 Ibid., 12.
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issues for the religious Right - social issues such as abortion, educational issues
such as the debates over evolution and creation science, public relations issues
such as the televangelism scandals of the 1980s, theological issues such as
eschatology. Through her close readings, Harding describes a rhetoric based on
Protestant fundamentalism’s unique understanding of the Bible, arguing for that
rhetoric’s central role in uniting divergent strains of conservative evangelicalism
around a shared vision of “America,” what it is and what it should be.50
The discourse that evolved through the efforts of Jerry Falwell and others
derived its power, she argues, by guiding willing listeners toward perceiving
political issues through the lens of the language conservative evangelicals
trusted most and with which they were most familiar - the language of the Bible.
While “Falwell’s fundamentalist empire” might indeed have been an “immense
empire of words,” calling it a “factory of words, a veritable Bible-based language
industry,” as Harding does, is somewhat misleading.51 Uniting a particular
political ideology (conservatism) with a particular religious faith (broadly
evangelical) was an effort that certainly required the movement’s leaders to self

50 Regarding the somewhat unlikely reconciliation of fundamentalists with
neo-evangelicals, Harding writes, “Most notably, forty years of ecumenical
crusade evangelism by Billy Graham’s organization, supplemented by the work
of Bill Bright [of Campus Crusade] and many others, had renewed and
reentrenched a shared elementary language of what counted as a Christian,
namely, someone who had realized he was a sinner, asked Jesus to forgive him,
and accepted Jesus into his heart as his personal savior.” By simplifying the
message to basics most could agree upon, these men “thus willfully worked
against the grain of the many forces that divided theologically conservative
Christians.” Susan Friend Harding, The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist
Language and Politics. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 19.
51 Ibid., 15.
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consciously develop a convincing and flexible rhetoric. That rhetoric, though,
evolved in such a way as to incorporate new ideas and new causes into a
language already spoken. Harding’s choice to remain on the well-worn path of
focusing on the religious Right’s leaders limits her ability to explain the efficacy of
such language, particularly its ability to consistently persuade such a large
contingency of “followers.” She justifies her almost-exclusive “focus on the
language of preachers” by arguing that “preachers are master-speakers. As they
teach their language through sermons, speeches, and writings and enact its
stories in their lives, they mold their church into the Church, a living sequel to the
Bible.”52 To a degree this claim is persuasive. Preachers, even in antihierarchical religious traditions like evangelicalism, play an important role in
guiding their flock. Denying the notion that to some degree pastors’ speech is
persuasive because they, as trusted authorities, speak it, would be naive. Yet
Harding’s reticence to qualify preachers’ power is itself an oversimplification of
the phenomenon she is trying to explain, making it hard to see the importance of
a reality that lurks behind her narrative. Preachers may be “master-speakers,”
but they only succeed in “molding their church” because the language they
master is a language that is for many of their “followers” quotidian, a discourse
whose presuppositions infuse the way in which most who tacitly affirm them
speak of nearly all of their experiences. Leaders like Falwell succeeded largely
because of their ability to use familiar verbal gestures and rhetorical techniques
for new ends and to address new causes. However, only because the preachers’
52 Ibid., xiii.
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language was also the listeners’ could the dissonances that occur between
Christian cause and economic or political cause be so widely camouflaged, and
the translation of right-wing economic or political causes into a legitimizing
religious language become so broadly convincing.
Whatever the weaknesses of her focus on leadership, Harding’s project is
truly innovative, and she succeeds in making a strong case for arguing that
actually believing the Bible is literally true, as fundamentalists by definition do
(and most conservative evangelicals do as well), lies at the foundation of a
unique and uniquely unifying discourse. This belief shapes how this particular
group of people interprets the past:
Biblical narrators, past and present, tell histories, the way things actually
happened. Their stories are literally true in the sense that they do not
represent history, they are history. Likewise, the connections that anointed
narrators propose between one story, such as Joshua’s [an Old
Testament figure], and another, such as Jerry [Falwell’s], are not mere
filaments of interpretation tying tales together in some folk fantasy. They
are historical tissues, sinews of divine purpose, design and will that join
concrete events across millennia.53
Harding is right to assert that “fundamentalists, and born-again Christians
generally, do not simply believe, they know, that the Bible is true and is still
coming true... [L]ike biblical realists before the coming of modernity, modern
Bible believers effectively and perpetually close the gap and so generate a world
53 Ibid., 110.
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in which their faith is obviously true.”54 For these people, the past as told in the
Bible provides the model by which people should presently live. Harding thus
hints at the ways in which this argument can be applied not just to the lens
through which many on the religious Right understand biblical history, but how
they understand history in general. With this knowledge it becomes less
surprising that United States’ own past - and specifically the historical privileging
of the Protestant moral code - should be upheld as a similar model, the model by
which all Americans should presently live. The way in which this particular group
reads their past and their world is the way they read the Bible - with the
assumption that there is one correct interpretation and with, in Margaret
Bendroth’s words, an “insistence on the utter reliability of God’s word” to provide
“answers to life’s mysteries, both social and personal.”55
V.

God and America in Wal-Mart Country

Susan Harding accurately reminds us that, “as fundamentalists,
pentecostals, charismatics, and even evangelicals, these theologically
conservative Protestants had until the late 1970s seen themselves as marginal, if
not enclaves or scattered remnants, relative to a perceived liberal Protestant
54 Ibid., 272. “The slippery slope argument and, more generally, the strict
Bible inerrancy polemic cover up the variety of interpretations of a text that
coexists even within one church. And they cover up the speed with which
interpretations, including official ones, can be revised - or even forgotten
altogether....” For example, “As support for segregation gradually eroded during
the late 1960s and 1970s, there was no debate about the truth of these Bible
verses. They simply stopped being cited. They, or rather their prevailing
interpretation which had been considered to be the biblically inerrant truth,
ceased to be part of the spoken Bible.” Ibid., 180-181.
55 Bendroth, Fundamentalism and Gender. 33-34.
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mainstream.”56 Harding emphasizes the central role a Bible-based language
played in creating a sense of shared vision and purpose between not-always
friendly “enclaves” of conservative evangelicals, arguing that “once they saw
themselves, and were seen, as related to one another and, taken together, as
the Protestant majority, their marginal days were numbered.”57 Recognizing the
existence and power of this Bible-based discourse itself, however, does little to
explain the connections between a project that for Harding began in Lynchburg,
Virginia in the mid-1970s and the efforts of people from across the United States
to rearticulate their sense of nationalism and their conservative political platform
in terms of their religious faith. In order to explain how conservative evangelicals
came to imagine themselves as a “majority” (to use Falwell’s term) and as the
true heirs and defenders of American identity, we must step back and look at the
development of their sense of national unity through close examination of the
regional contexts which inspired and reinforced the acts of translation required to
claim “America” as conservative evangelicals’ own.
Bethany Moreton’s To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian
Free Enterprise, as its subtitle suggests, centers on how capitalism became not
just an American but a “Christian” thing to do. Wal-Mart was established in rural
Arkansas, where Jeffersonian-style populist democracy and evangelical Christian
faith had long grown hand-in-hand. The rapidly-interconnecting world of the postWorld War Two era and the Sunbelt’s growing role in fulfilling Cold War demands
56 Harding, Jerry Falwell. 20.
57 Ibid., 20.
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created new realities and opportunities, simultaneously challenging long-held
beliefs about the importance of small-scale democracy and a patriarchal family
and community structure. The growth of corporate capitalism from the turn of the
century forward, along with rural women’s need to become wage-earners in order
to supplement the suffering farm economy were unstoppable changes. The
inevitability of these changes is nonetheless an inadequate explanation of
people’s attitude toward them. Moreton’s study of Wal-Mart’s development
reveals the ways in which the company repackaged free enterprise so that “mass
consumption [became] safe for the white Protestant heartland, and mass service
work [became] an honorable zone of endeavor,” a project that proved to be the
key to the company’s otherwise-unlikely success.58 Together, Wal-Mart’s leaders
and the local Arkansas populace succeeded over the course of several decades
into translating what was once unpalatable to a deeply-religious region into terms
that made consumption and service work not just acceptable, but appear to many
to be the truly American - and Christian - way of life.59
Moreton argues that “the new Republican coalition” that emerged around
the 1980 presidential election “comprised a pair of strange bedfellows: laissezfaire champions of the free market unevenly yoked to a broad base of

58 Moreton, Wal-Mart. 88.
59 Moreton explains that by “entering the waged work force under a
service economy rather than an industrial one, they changed both work and
family life, and crafted a new ideology to explain the relationship between the
two. For the emerging Wal-Mart constituency, faith in God and faith in the market
grew in tandem.” Ibid., 5.
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evangelical activists.”60 Why the combination of these two things, particularly
when “the very antigovernment, probusiness policies” for which so many of these
working Americans were voting “undermined their own tenuous place in the
middle class?”61 Moreton makes the simple but important observation that
geographical locality and economic necessity played a part in fusing key ideas.
Quite simply, when, in the 1960s and 1970s, “Wal-Mart’s rapid growth and
increasing technological sophistication forced the retailer to recruit new
managers on college campuses, it turned to the nearby Christian colleges.”62
Drawing upon local resources - in this case Christian colleges - was at one level
a pragmatic choice. “Small Protestant colleges and big businesses,” however,
“were not traditional allies”:
At least initially, [Christian colleges’] broader faculty constituency was
rarely independently motivated by the cause so much as alive to the
practical benefits, generally in favor of free-market economics - they
taught business, after all - and alert to the interesting teaching and
research opportunities offered by the new subfield. Forging the alloy of
Christian free enterprise required tremendous effort and resources, and
the zeal of one or two ideologically committed proponents... Once the
genie was out of the bottle, however, the equation shifted. The new

60 Ibid., 4.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., 127.
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centers and majors drew faculty as well as students with those interests,
and the corporate sponsors’ influence became ubiquitous 63
Whatever novelty there was to what was born out of practical necessity for
business and religious leadership, then, gradually wore off, becoming accepted
as common sense to their respective and overlapping constituencies.
However influential those initially-pragmatic choices were in the long run,
Moreton asserts that the key to understanding the forging of “Christian free
enterprise” in the Ozarks and beyond lies in the way in which Wal-Mart’s version
of free enterprise was rhetorically refashioned to fit within the explicitly religious
framework of “Christian service.” Sam Walton, well-aware of the resistance local
Arkansans would have for any northern-style big chain stores, inaugurated this
approach with his decidedly local tack. When he opened “his first Wal-Mart
Discount City in 1962,” Walton knew he would have to promote “his enterprise as
an Ozarks affair.”64 Moreton argues that “the Wal-Mart mode of shopping
removed several traditional stumbling blocks for Christian devotees of
consumption.”65 First, “the entire dime-store tradition” off of which Wal-Mart was
initially modeled signified “frugality, not opulence,” something thrifty Arkansans
would have resisted.66 Secondly, in communities that idealized patriarchal family
structures, “as long as mass buying could mean procuring humble products ‘for
the family,’ as long as men could perform women’s work without losing their

63 Ibid.,
64 Ibid.,
65 Ibid.,
66 Ibid.,
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authority, as long as front-line service workers could derive dignity and meaning
from their labors, the service economy could survive its internal contradictions.
Consumer capitalism could be born again.”67 Because “in this context, the salient
identity became not citizen-consumer nor worker of the world, but Christian
servant,” the potential tensions between conservative evangelical faith, white
middle-class material interests, patriarchal family structure, and free market
capitalism could be overlooked.68
The economic realities of Wal-Mart’s corporate capitalism may have
resembled those of any large corporation, but the evangelical-friendly rhetoric
and practices in which Wal-Mart packaged itself worked to discourage the
populace from closely critiquing the company. Sam Walton and his peers knew
that Wal-Mart could only succeed if it spoke the language of its people, and in
cooperation with the people themselves, the company forged a “gospel of free
enterprise.”69 The language of Christian service bestowed upon free enterprise
not just spiritual significance, but also a way to retain an important sense of
continuity about the values that had long mattered most in Wal-Mart country the dignity of “self-sufficiency” and “family stability and masculine authority” - in a
rapidly-changing world.70 A “particular historical moment, a particular geography,
and a particular religious ecology” thus shaped and fulfilled Sam Walton’s
business vision, but Wal-Mart’s success'“was not a simple matter of elite

67 Ibid., 89.
68 Ibid., 101.
69 Ibid., 270.
70 Ibid.
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manipulation; it did not make political dupes of Kansans or Arkansans.”71 Rather,
the way in which Wal-Mart’s leadership presented the business resonated with
the needs of a regional culture in crisis. Wal-Mart country’s deeply religious
demographic recognized and found reassurance in a rhetoric that put inevitable
and potentially threatening changes in a positive, familiar language. And, once
translated, the gospel of free enterprise could become not just a part of their
political platform, but a compatible component of their faith itself.
Bethany Moreton argues for Wal-Mart’s significant part in making free
enterprise believably compatible with conservative evangelicalism in the Ozark
region. She does not explore how those conservative evangelicals, who came to
widely accept that notion that their faith had always upheld free enterprise policy
and practice, also came to assert the “truth” of this conflation with the “true”
American way. While Ruth Murray Brown does not focus on economics as does
Moreton, in For a Christian America: A History of the Religious Right, she
explores a parallel conflation and offers applicable insights. Brown argues that
the campaign against the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in the 1970s laid a
significant portion of the groundwork for the formation of the religious Right in the
1980s by mobilizing conservative evangelical women to political action.72 The

71 Ibid.
72 Brown’s claim that the anti-ERA movement laid “the foundation for what
came to be called the Christian Right” is, as are many of her claims, overstated,
as even the few books discussed within this review essay make clear.
Nevertheless, she makes a strong case for the movement’s important role both in
explaining the rise of and understanding the nature of the “Christian Right.” Ruth
Murray Brown, For a “Christian America”: A History of the Religious Right.
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2002), 16.
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movement to defeat the ERA began in earnest in Oklahoma, the first state to
deny ratification of the amendment (in March 1972) and part of the same “WalMart country” that Moreton studies. While Moreton explains the desire to uphold
a patriarchal family model and the resistance to big government and big business
in regional and historical terms, Brown proposes another explanation. The heart
of Brown’s argument is that a particular patriarchal view of the family, as well as
a refusal to countenance any government interference in the family, persuaded
evangelical women and their allies in Oklahoma and the surrounding states in
particular to work to defeat the ERA. However many other factors may have
contributed to the regional development and elevation of patriarchy and
resistance to state interference, Brown insists that those fighting the ERA
themselves understood their ideal family model as essentially sacred, rooted in
their religious worldview. Thus, “On a very personal level, they feared that
entrenching feminist values in the Constitution would mean the end of their Biblebased way of life.”73
This fear that their “Bible-based way of life” was at stake stemmed largely
from the fact that conservative evangelicals throughout the South, as Brown
argues, had become increasingly “disturbed” by the “rebelling against the norms
of personal behavior” that had occurred particularly dramatically throughout the
1960s. The ratification effort for the ERA, insists Brown, provided one of the first
opportunities for these concerned citizens to articulate their fears in a public
manner and mobilize in a specific, nationally-important effort. However popular 73 Ibid., 15.
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and at times accurate - the assumption that conservative evangelicals’
conscious intent in their mobilization was to regain political power lost in the
earlier part of the twentieth century, Brown reminds us that for many of the
women who fought against ratification, “the real threat of the ERA was not just
the specifics of unisex restrooms or of drafting women, or even of legalizing
abortion - things emphasized by the popular media - but the broader threat of
government interference with the right of families to raise their children in the
ways prescribed by their religion. They saw defeating the ERA as a way of
restoring those rights and halting moral decline.”74
Brown’s phrasing makes it easy to pass over the fact that “restoring those
rights” and “halting moral decline” were two distinct rhetorical stances, however
often they were intertwined. While understanding the anti-Era campaign as
merely an attempt by certain religious groups to defend and protect their
particular way of life holds some truth, it is only partially accurate, for it does not
offer a satisfactory interpretation of the reasons why they not only fought against
what they perceived would negatively affect themselves personally, but why they
also sought to instate their way of life on the entire nation. Importantly, Brown
herself “came to see that the early fight against the ERA was just one facet of the
struggle to regain what they believed was a lost Christian heritage.”75 As noted
earlier, those who celebrated the nation’s “Christian heritage” could find
affirmation of their stance in the Cold War government-promoted religious
74 Ibid., 16.
75 Ibid., 16.
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nationalism that Herzog describes and whose broadly Christian language they
could quite easily (mis)read as an official endorsement of their way of life as the
“American” way of life. Furthermore, Brown effectively demonstrates that “the
arguments of the Christian Right in these cases are... plausible if one accepts
the premises that constitutional interpretation should be limited to the actual
words of the original Constitution, and that practices common in the early
nineteenth century should therefore be allowed in the late twentieth century as
well.”76 Believing that the Constitution should be interpreted in a similar literal,
devotional way as the Bible, and believing that an idealized point in the American
past provides the model whereby we all should live were beliefs that stemmed
directly from fundamentalist theology. Furthermore, Brown’s argument intersects
with Susan Harding’s here, for “the pastors of [these women’s] churches, like
Jeremiah in the Old Testament, prophes[ied] the wrath of God’s judgment
against the people... The belief that God would punish America for her sins,
preached in so many churches, primed fundamentalists to join a movement
promising to ‘turn it around.’”77 Brown’s example offers further confirmation of
Harding’s idea that fundamentalists and their less-strict evangelical counterparts
tended to envision themselves as a continuation of and modeling their lives after
the stories of the Bible. Thus, reading America as a type of Israel,
fundamentalists and conservative evangelicals broadly remained convinced that
“God looks with favor on America because of the ‘faith of the forefathers’... [Anti-

76 Ibid., 240.
77 Ibid., 73.
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ERA activists] were appalled at what they saw as America’s moral decline, not
only because they personally disapproved of societal trends and attitudes, but
because they believed that God’s favor” upon America “is conditional.”78
Why did so many people find a reading of “American” identity as a type of
Israel so appealing and convincing? The answers are complex and many, as
always. Brown’s work, however, highlights the importance of the belief that the
United States’ (highly mythologized) moment of founding provided, like Israel’s
founding moment, the blueprint for what the nation’s identity ought to be.
Perhaps just as importantly, “the social life of a Church of Christ member [and
members of many other conservative evangelical denominations] is... closely
circumscribed by church activities, so there is less opportunity to develop ideas
independent of the church.”79 The very fact that religious activities absorbed antiERA activists’ mental and social activities suggests how a highly-stable, selfsustaining interpretation can develop. For the Oklahoman fundamentalists Brown
interviewed, the larger portion of their social time was spent conversing with
those who agreed with them and shared their religiously-grounded worldview. In
a region in which religious life has, as Moreton emphasizes, long dominated the
cultural landscape, it should perhaps not be surprising at all that experience and
constant community affirmation would make it rather natural to assume that one’s
particular way of seeing the world was universally true, and therefore applicable
to everyone. Thus, the campaign that Brown describes carried, for those
78 Ibid., 235.
79 Ibid.,75.
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Oklahoma women who fought against the ERA, the weight of saving not just
these conservative evangelical women’s own skins, but of saving the soul of the
nation itself.
VI.

California: Bringing Conservative Evangelical Nationalism to the National
Stage
Lisa McGirr’s Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right

reinforces Jonathan Herzog’s conclusion that the Cold War decisively shaped the
development of the New Right, of which the religious Right, with its loud defense
of a “Christian America,” was a part. McGirr’s work is a case study of the
suburban culture of Orange County, California. Orange County is often
considered the heart of the Cold-War military-industrial complex, a region whose
economic development exploded as a result during the decades following World
War Two. It was within this rapidly-growing and ever-changing landscape that the
white, middle-class citizens who contributed to and benefited from California’s
military-industrial complex lived and worked. These denizens of the burgeoning
suburbs, McGirr argues, were critical in uniting the “distinct ideological strands of
right-wing thought” - social conservatism and economic libertarianism - that
became the platform of an increasingly coherent movement that, by the 1980
presidential election, had gained enough momentum to shape politics on a
national scale.80 McGirr sets her work against a long tradition in both popular
media and contemporary scholarship of portraying this recent strain of
80 Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American
Right. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 152.
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conservatism as a collection of “emotional, irrational ‘kooks’” motivated by
“psychological distress.”81 This, McGirr insists, is not only unfair, but inaccurate.
The emergence of the New Right was from the get-go a largely mainstream
affair, as its vibrant presence outside of the almost-mythical rural “backwoods” of
the South makes clear. McGirr studies the issues that motivated these new
suburbanites (largely eager emigres from the South) to political action. She also
carefully examines the environment in which these suburbanites lived, parses the
rhetoric of key conservative political leaders to discover that rhetoric’s appeal to
the suburbanites, and conducts oral histories, allowing a number of these
“warriors” to speak for themselves. Through these various means, McGirr
attempts to access the reasons why the New Right was able to expand to the
national stage - and stay there. Upsetting the popular notion of conservative
appeal as essentially irrational, McGirr proposes instead that, in light of their
regional context and the evidence of their own lives, for successful suburban
Orange Countians at least, the new economic and social conservatism that
comprised the New Right quite simply made sense. While Suburban Warriors
treats religion only briefly and primarily obliquely, it is nevertheless an important
contribution to the effort to identify the various threads that merged to allow and
encourage the conflation of evangelical faith, conservative politics, and
nationalism that this paper examines.
How did such a fusion come to make sense, however? For McGirr, the
key lies in understanding context, and more specifically, the way in which the
81 Ibid., 6-7.
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Orange County environment and culture - “a fertile seedbed for right-wing
growth” - shaped these suburbanites’ political stances.82 The fusion of economic
and social conservatism that came to define the New Right proved persuasive
because it resonated not only with these suburbanites’ firmly-rooted moral and
spiritual beliefs, but because the two threads together resonated with many
Orange Countians’ lived experience. Put simply, “The middle-class men and
women who populated Orange County found meaning in a set of politics that
affirmed the grounding of their lives in individual success and yet critiqued the
social consequences of the market by calling for a return to ‘traditional’ values,
local control, strict morality, and strong authority.”83 Whatever justification these
members of the emerging “New Right” might themselves have given for their
political activities, one thing stands out from a more distanced perspective - it
was in their own interest to make sense of the lives they were living in a way that
justified that lifestyle. To do so, they drew ideas together that there had been less
of an impetus to draw together before. Within the context of their experience, the
New Right agenda seemed intuitively, if not tightly logically, correct to these
suburbanites.
In order for any sort of shared mindset uniting people in political
endeavors to emerge, however, communication networks must develop. Orange
Countians had to deliberately and self-consciously forge these networks in the
isolating environment of sprawling, depersonalizing suburbia. Thus, while the

82 Ibid., 15.
83 Ibid., 53.
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grassroots activists that McGirr studies did not, for the most part, have a national
political agenda on their minds at the outset, they did deliberately search out and
maintain connections with others like themselves. As McGirr explains, “It was...
in the mundane yet complex world of school battles, evangelical churches, and
local politics, that the grassroots New Right asserted itself,” and suburban
grassroots activists received increasing confirmation of a broadly shared identity
through their gradually snowballing connections with others who shared their
views.84 These activities and communication networks met not only their political
aims, but their desires for community as well. McGirr argues that the reality (and
equally important sense) of being part of a large community of like-minded
people only continued to expand as a result of conservative rhetoric de
radicalized after Barry Goldwater’s presidential campaign, “the debacle of
1964.”85 McGirr insists that after this moment of self-evaluation, “these men and
women” of suburban Orange County “appreciated the need to jettison the
controversial rhetoric that had gotten Goldwater into trouble. In effect, they
expounded a new brand of conservatism.”86 As suburban life expanded to more
(white) Americans and the nation’s moral climate became more tumultuous, “the
reworked conservative package, voiced ever more in the language of the
‘people,’ resonated with growing numbers of Americans, bringing conservatives

84 Ibid., 56.
85 Ibid., 196.
86 Ibid..
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to a position of power that they had previously enjoyed only prior to the New
Deal.”87
While McGirr’s focus is on the New Right as a whole, not merely its
religious arm, she nonetheless takes a significant amount of time to answer the
question, “Why were so many Orange Countians attracted to [conservative
evangelical] churches?”88 This way this question is phrased unfortunately implies
that these suburbanites came to church only after they became politically active,
or else that conservative evangelical churches and politically active suburbanites
were two separate groups of people. These implications are, as Darren Dochuk’s
work will shortly make clear, very much not the case. Still, McGirr is right to argue
that “the grassroots dissatisfaction with the trend of national politics may have
come to naught, had it not been for the institutional support provided by
strategically placed local organizations,” and churches were among these
organizations.89 McGirr’s emphasis on external environmental factors leads her
to quite logically intuit that these people’s search for community “in a privatized,
physically isolated landscape” in part compelled them to find that community
where it already existed, and evangelical churches were one of those places.90
To an extent, McGirr acknowledges the importance of many suburbanites’ pre
existing religiosity, admitting that while “a belief in conservative Protestant
doctrine did not make a right-wing political activist..., these adherents’ normative

87 Ibid.,
88 Ibid.,
89 Ibid.,
90 Ibid.,
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conservatism, firm religious convictions, and moral values helped infuse a
socially conservative political culture.”91 However, she does not fully explore the
idea that, while it is highly likely that many people used churches as political
platforms simply because the churches were there, it seems equally likely that
those who worked through these institutions chose to do so because they
believed there were religious reasons for the battles they fought. Here it is helpful
to recall Jonathan Herzog’s discussion of the “spiritual-industrial complex,”
particularly since fighting Communism was in large part the first “cause” for
McGirr’s New Right. If Herzog is right in his assessment that anti-Communism
became a concern to religious people largely because it had been framed as an
essentially spiritual conflict, then it also seems likely that people of faith living in
prosperous, suburban Orange County might have conceived of “political”
activities as essentially spiritual ones.
McGirr’s work thus somewhat obliquely addresses the connection
between the conservative political bent and a conservative evangelical religious
worldview. She nevertheless manages to highlight several key ideas that help
explain that connection. First, she affirms the importance of remembering that
people with shared beliefs tend to attract each other, which easily paves the way
for that particular group to re-imagine their particularities as universals. Second,
she makes a strong case (as Ruth Murray Brown does, too) for examining the
way in which particular environments tend to lead people to universalize and
valorize their personal narratives about how they got where they are. Her organic
91 Ibid.
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explanation thus offers some important clues as to how those who conflated
religion, capitalism, social conservatism, and American patriotism were able to
believe that conflation was, in a way, eternally true.
Whereas Orange County for McGirr is merely one “lens” through which to
examine the rise of the New Right, for Darren Dochuk, Southern California was
not just the heart of the broader New Right. It also functioned as the incubator for
the fusion of right-wing politics, nationalism, and conservative evangelicalism that
would become the distinguishing mark of the Religious Right. In From Bible Belt
to Sunbelt: Plain-Folk Religion. Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical
Conservatism. Dochuk argues that many of these Southern Californians, recent
migrants from the western South, not only brought with them a distinctive
“Southern evangelicalism” whose pragmatic, confident “Texas theology”
blossomed in a “Hollywood culture” that demanded innovation and adaptation,
but whose continuing connections to the South played a critical role in
evangelicalism’s politicization on a national scale.92 Perhaps most importantly,
though, the fact that they, “like all other evangelicals, ...held fast to certain core
tenets - the primacy of individual conversion, the inerrancy and infallibility of the
92 Darren Dochuk, From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain-Folk Religion.
Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Conservative Evangelicalism. (New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 2011), xvii. Dochuk elaborates this web of
connections, arguing that “developments within the West Coast’s evangelical
subculture did not unfold in isolation but rather transpired within the context of an
emerging Sunbelt. Though always present during the early cold war years,
religious interchange between Southern California and the South gained
importance on a national scale in the late 1960s and 1970s as preachers and
politicians sought ways to undo the Democratic Party’s ‘Solid South.’ In this
context of political upheaval, California precedents became pedagogy for others.”
Bible Belt, xxi.
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Bible, and the scriptural injunction to witness for Christ” masked the flexibility of
those beliefs to adapt to new circumstances.93 Furthermore, the central role of
the biblical terms with which these people had long understood their realities
allowed them to remain confident in the rightness of their causes. Dochuk
therefore makes explicit what McGirr only occasionally and obliquely implies that the terms through which these now-Californian conservative evangelicals
understood themselves and their world infused their activities as “plain folk,”
“preachers,” and “entrepreneurs” with spiritual weight and moral purpose.
For Dochuk, historicizing the belief system that the emigres brought with
them from the South to Southern California is a critical prerequisite to
understanding the increasing politicization of their faith over the last half of the
twentieth century. The “western South,” the region from which many of the new
Californians hailed (and which overlaps much of Moreton’s Wal-Mart country),
had, as noted before, fostered a unique “populist Americanism” that was
“inspired by the mythologized ideal of Thomas Jefferson’s virtuous yeoman
farmer.”94 Furthermore, it was “the dialectic of being southern and western, of
wanting to preserve and create, defend and advance” that “not only motivated
them in their personal quests for fruitful lives, but led them to believe collectively

93 Ibid., xvii.
94 Ibid., 9. Dochuk identifies this western South as the culture that
developed west of the Mississippi, “a region centered at the intersection of the
borders of Arkansas, Texas, and Oklahoma but also extending westward along
the Oklahoma-Texas panhandle and north-south between Missouri and
Louisiana.” 8.
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that they and their plain-folk Americanism held the keys to a better society.”95
Perhaps most importantly for these southern evangelicals, “Jefferson and Jesus”
had long embraced, and “at the core of their political culture was an unwavering
faith that conflated [these] doctrines.”96 Thus, this heritage of “Jeffersonian
precepts [that] came wrapped in a package of Christian, plain-folk Americanisms”
formed an “all-encompassing worldview that gave white southerners especially a
sense of guardianship over their society” that they carried with them to California
beginning in roughly the 1930s.97
These emigres framed their “sense of guardianship,” however, not
primarily in political terms, but in religious ones. Dochuk revises the way
“historians of the South have described this region’s out-migration” from the
1930s forward “by using Old Testament allegories.”98 Historians, however, have
wrongly portrayed these white southerners as being in “exile,” like the Israelites
in Babylon. This, claims Dochuk, is not the biblical parallel white southerners
would have chosen for themselves:
[These southern evangelicals] chose to say that they were on an “errand,”
like the Apostle Paul journeying from Jerusalem to Macedonia - and the
Puritans from England to North America - commissioned by God to
evangelize the wilderness in hopes of saving it and the people they left
behind... Confident of their religious heritage, they... envisioned
95 Ibid., 13.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid., xx.
98 Ibid., xviii.
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themselves on a mission rather than forced egress. The choice of
metaphor was important, for it not only enabled them intellectually, it also
made them active participants in the seismic social transformations of the
period."
While “southern evangelicals thus carried with them a mandate to make their
religion count” into their new Californian context, this was simultaneously a call to
make their politics count, too, if for no other reason than that, “in the world from
which they came, the distinction [between religion and politics] was a false
one.”100 Not all of southern evangelicals’ political leanings drew directly upon
their faith. Nevertheless their sense of “errand,” combined with the tendency to
“wrap” all ideas “in a package” of first and foremost their own unique Christian
language, provided the impetus not just to see their world in these terms, but to
shape their world to fit those terms as well - a project that, in their minds,
transcended political boundaries.101
Dochuk’s book also “examines the clash of cultural views that resulted
from southern evangelicalism’s West Coast sojourn,” a clash whose lines were
drawn, Dochuk argues, first in battles over organized labor between “Social
99 Ibid., xix.
100 Ibid., xviii, xix.
101 Ibid., xxii. Dochuk elaborates later, “The sense of mission that
animated their move west only added to the righteousness of this responsibility. It
helped these once independent farmers and townsfolk now working assembly
lines in colossal manufacturing and defense plants to know that they were
assisting a divine plan. This concept of Christian servitude was psychologically
soothing, but such vivid spiritual imagination was more than a coping
mechanism. It also served as a blueprint for civic engagement and a public
declaration that they would not be isolated in their blue-collar suburban
enclaves.” Ibid., 26.
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Democrats on one hand, southern evangelical populists on the other.”102 What
appeared to many to initially be a fight between party factions, however, belied
the deeper differences between the dramatically different lenses through which
these two groups viewed the world. Dochuk’s argument that these “southern
evangelical populists” became self-aware of their political potential as a group
“first contemplated in the pew and then exercised in the community” is telling,
and a subtle but marked difference from McGirr’s description of the order of
those events.103 The growing contingent of Social Democrats, then, represented
not just a political or social threat, but a spiritual threat as well, and thus, these
new Californians, envisioning themselves not just as Christian soldiers but
simultaneously as “American patriots” confronted with a newly-realized “enemy,”
“needed to marshal their energy against a liberal establishment that assailed
congregational and personal sovereignty in matters of faith as easily as it
undermined the autonomy of neighborhood and nation state in matters of
governance.”104 The dual threat that the liberal establishment posed clearly
encouraged these evangelicals to consider their political roles as “American
patriots” as deeply sacred ones as well.
The ways that McGirr and Dochuk understand the impetus for believing in
an inherent unity behind particular parts of a political agenda and a vision of
American identity represent two different pieces to the puzzle that is conservative
evangelicals’ persistent claims to “own America.” Whereas McGirr insists that the
102 Ibid., xx.
103 Ibid., xx.
104 Ibid., xx-xxi.
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much of the glue between conservative ideas for suburbanites in Orange County
derived largely from a need to justify their lifestyle and a desire for community,
Dochuk argues that for southern evangelicals, at least, the reason that the
amalgamation of free-market, socially conservative ideals, and evangelical
religion appeared self-evident and essentially “American” is that the devotional
stance of southern evangelicals toward nearly all aspects of life left little felt need
for communal introspection.105 The all-subsuming nature of this vision of the
“errand” bolstered the presumption that critical critique regarding the compatibility
of assimilated ideas was unnecessary so far as those ideas could be translated
into evangelical language.
VII.

Conclusion

Who owns “America”? The politicization of evangelicalism vividly evident
in the emergence of an identifiable “religious Right” in the late 1970s and early
1980s is one historical moment in which the members of a particular group conservative evangelicals in this case - claimed the right to offer themselves as
the answer. For conservative evangelicals from roughly mid-century forward,
discussions of Christian and American identity were increasingly intertwined, and
intertwined with the acceptance both of conservative economic and social
policies. Conservative evangelical claims to be the rightful heirs and loyal
defenders of the “American way” have persisted well into the twenty-first century,
105 “Theirs was not, in other words, an intellectual engagement meant to
scrutinize the structural underpinnings of capitalism or, conversely, simply put
one’s mind at ease with the system. It was, rather, an exercise in devotion, of
learning how to interpret financial reward in the context of spiritual blessing and
maximize money for advancement of Christ’s kingdom on earth.” Ibid., 183.
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in the face of persistent and quite vocal opposition. Such claims appear not just
in political contexts but in literature directed solely at those who share the
conservative evangelical faith. These two observations are important.
Acknowledging them makes a strong case for arguing that conservative
evangelicals did not just invent those claims as a matter of political expediency
(however accurate such a judgment may be in many cases), but that they
themselves believed those claims. If we accept that conservative evangelicals
have sincerely believed in the absolute truth of their “Christian Americanism,”
however, and if we also accept Foucault’s call to question “the inviolable identity”
of any concept, we must also begin to investigate the ways and means by which
that conflation of American identity, evangelical religion, and conservative, New
Right politics was made to appear as “common sense” to so many.106
The works discussed in this paper put us well on our way toward
beginning a genealogy of that process. David Sehat offers a very strong case for
recognizing the existence of a Protestant “moral establishment” from the birth of
the United States and into the twentieth century. Introducing theories of
hegemony into this discussion helps to explain the moral establishment’s shift
from an often silently coercive power to a vocally disputed ideology, an ideology
defended by conservative evangelicals from the Cold War period to the present.
Jonathan Herzog’s work on the deliberately and explicitly religious character of
early Cold War tactics partially explains how a “holy war that once concerned all
religious Americans,” from Catholics to liberal and mainstream Protestants,
106 Foucault, “Genealogy,” 142.
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became “the province, and indeed the obsession, of a fraction of them.”107 Susan
Harding demonstrates through intensive close reading that conservative
evangelicals’ unique understanding of the Bible as literally true has the tendency
of bestowing the appearance of absolute truth to whatever ideas are explained in
those biblical terms, at least to all those who speak the language. Bethany
Moreton, Ruth Murray Brown, Lisa McGirr, and Darren Dochuk all argue for the
important role regional context plays in clarifying our understanding of the
reasons why certain concepts fed into the definition of evangelicals’ ideal
“America” and others did not. Together, these four authors also demonstrate the
commonalities across regions, particularly the way in which what Harding terms
“fundamentalist language” helped translate ideas that resonated with largely
white, middle class, patriarchal communities into terms more palatable to deeply
religious populations. From Virginia to California by the 1980s, this particular
discourse had worked to effectively mask the genealogy of the conflation of
evangelical faith with a conservative vision of “America,” bestowing upon that
conflation the appearance of timeless truth.

107 Herzog, Spiritual-Industrial Complex. 207.
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Chapter 2: “Saints or Censors”: Two Texans and the Art of Persuasion
I.

Introduction

In his introduction to education activists Mel and Norma Gablers’ 1985
book, What Are They Teaching our Children?, James C. Hefley, a Southern
Baptist freelance writer, was simply noting the obvious when he stated, “Hardly
anyone who has heard anything about them remains neutral.”108 Hefley
articulated this apparent lack of middle ground by stating that the Gablers, most
clearly identifiable with the part of the conservative resurgence that became the
religious Right, were “either hated or adored, praised or shellacked, labeled
saints or censors.”109 This at first puzzling dualism, “saints or censors,” is
nonetheless the key to making sense out of the Gablers’ manifesto. Given a
cursory reading, their writing appears to be little more than a woefullydisorganized, self-contradictory, often-redundant fusion of polemic, appeal, and
battle cry. Yet a close reading of their rhetoric suggests that the book’s surface
incoherence is largely an effect of so much rhetorical static, static produced by
the Gablers’ apparent attempt to simultaneously speak to their allies and
persuade the unconvinced to join their side. The resulting interference masks a
quite stable logic that runs throughout their book, a logic rooted in fundamentalist
theological concepts regarding the nature of truth. Taken alone, the phrase
“saints or censors” appears to be a comparison, to use the old adage, between
apples and oranges. Yet by rhetorically crafting “saints” and “censors” as a
. 108 Mel Gabler and Norma Gabler, What Are They Teaching Our
Children?, ed. James C. Hefley (Wheaton, IL: Victor Books, 1985), 5.
109 Ibid., 5.
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dualism, Hefley perhaps unwittingly encapsulated the character of debates
between politically-active conservative evangelicals and many of their opponents.
In the early 1980s in particular, proponents and opponents of religious Right
stances often appeared to be talking past one another, an effect that I argue
stems from the fact that the two “sides” of these debates consistently argued
from two not so much oppositional as entirely different sets of premises,
premises that remained largely unarticulated.
To borrow Gene Burns’ concept from The Moral Veto: Framing
Contraception. Abortion, and Cultural Pluralism in the United States, the Gablers
and their opponents relied upon two quite different “frames” by which to
understand and articulate what they each believed were the proper aims of
education, and what they believed constituted “the good” for individuals and for
society.110 In nearly every encounter, both sides “implicitly legitimize[d] one way
of framing” debates over public school textbooks, and “implicitly” is an important
word.111 In their responses to the Gablers, journalists and educators alike
presumed upon a basic level of agreement regarding the notion that education in
the United States was and ought to be about figuring out how best to develop
future citizens who would sustain democratic practices in a pluralistic society.
Thus, they were befuddled by those who, like the Gablers, were similarly
110 Burns explains, “By asking how people ‘frame’ contraception or
abortion, I mean to ask, what do they think the issue is about? For instance, is
abortion primarily about ‘unborn children’ (as the pro-life frame would insist) or is
it about women’s right to choose (as the pro-choice frame would insist)?” Gene
Burns, The Moral Veto: Framing Contraception. Abortion, and Cultural Pluralism
in the United States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 7.
111 Ibid., 7.
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presuming upon a basic level of agreement regarding their own, entirely different
frame. They understood education as concerned first and foremost with
children’s “proper” moral and spiritual development, towards which there was
only ever one right avenue. Using this frame, the Gablers understood “good
citizenship” to be less the aim of “good education” than an inevitable byproduct of
it, achieved only when children were taught what was to them most important accepting the eternally-stable absolute “truth” of what they called the “JudeoChristian Bible” (as, of course, the Gablers and their fellow conservative
evangelicals understood and applied it).112
The Gablers’ conservative evangelical religious identity (their
understanding of themselves as “saints” - possessors of and missionaries for a
single, unified system of God-given truth and morality) by its very nature
undergirded and informed their political activities as concerned U.S. citizens. The
rhetorical strategies that the Gablers use in their 1985 book What Are They
Teaching Our Children? suggest, however, that the couple was aware that in
order to reach beyond those who already adhered to their faith, their goals and
concerns would have to be translated into what Jurgen Habermas has called
“generically accessible language.”113 In this paper, I will first examine the way in
which the Gablers attempt to create a kind of “common ground” between their
allies and those less convinced of the Gablers’ positions. They attempt to do so
by appealing to the affective image of the child, asserting that children’s safety
112 Gabler and Gabler, Our Children. 160.
113 Habermas, “Political Theology,” 26.
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and well-being is the primary issue at stake in the choice between their view and
their opponents’ view. I will then proceed to look at the ways in which the Gablers
deploy the language of democratic citizenship (raising questions of majority
versus minority rights, taxpayer status, and what histories and values qualify as
truly “American”) in an effort to demonstrate that their perspective is not
provincial, but applicable to all “true” Americans. Finally, I will identify the
Gablers’ a priori presumptions, rooted in conservative evangelical theology, that
appear to together comprise the linchpin of their book’s logic.
Philosopher Jonathan Glover uses the image of “a wire frame... made of
many bits of rigid wire” to attempt to correct the erroneous idea that religious
adherents operate within a system that is itself necessarily static.114 “You can
choose the shape of any bit of the frame,” his analogy goes, “provided you allow
the rest of the frame to bend and twist to accommodate it. The belief you want to
preserve at all costs is the bit you hold rigid, letting this determine the shape of
the rest of the frame.” 115 Following this analogy, in their efforts to persuade those
outside of religious Right circles, the Gablers were forced to choose which “bit” of
their “frame” they were willing to bend. Despite their attempt to speak a
“generically accessible language,” their prioritization of their particular vision of
“sainthood,” and the way in which they framed all issues around that implicit
vision, was precisely what was unacceptable to their opponents and nonnegotiable for them. The rhetorical static that results is in part what perpetuated
114 Jonathan Glover, Humanity: A Moral IHistorv of the Twentieth Century
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 266.
115 Ibid.
58

the mutual frustration between opponents who both seemed incapable of ever
“answer[ing]... objections specifically.”116
II.

Background: Making New Allies

“Mel and Norma Gabler are, without a doubt, the most publicized and
controversial couple in American education,” Hefley claimed in his introduction.117
At least in the first half of the 1980s, there was some truth to this claim. The
Texas couple, long devoted to voicing their concerns about public school
textbooks, exemplified for many in the media and academia a critical point of
convergence, the intersection of the waves of political and religious conservatism
whose magnitude and power, after decades of more liberal trends, caught many
by surprise.118 Republican Ronald Reagan swept past incumbent Democrat
Jimmy Carter in the 1980 election. Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority, founded in
1979, was only one of a slew of similar religiously-grounded political
organizations proliferating at this time. There was also, in historian and educator
Diane Ravitch’s words, “a palpable sense” nationwide “that something had to

116 Gabler and Gabler, Our Children, 99.
117lbid., 5. For more on Hefley and his associations with the conservative
takeover of the Southern Baptist Convention in 1984, see Joni B. Hannigan,
“James C. Hefley, Author of Truth in Crisis’ Dies at 73,” Baptist Press. March 22,
2004, http://www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?id=17899, (accessed May 2, 2013).
1 Sociologist Nancy Tatom Ammerman, writing at the end of the 1980s,
recalled, “The emergence of Fundamentalism in the 1970s, seemingly from
nowhere, caught Americans by surprise... [I]n 1980, a large bloc of religious
people, claiming the label Fundamentalist, opposed Carter, and we were faced
with an even more serious challenge to our assumptions about what
Evangelicals and Fundamentalists were, where they were located, and what
might be expected from them.” Nancy Tatom Ammerman, Bible Believers:
Fundamentalists in the Modern World (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
Press, 1987), 1.
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done to improve educational standards.”119 The 1983 national report, A Nation at
Risk confirmed this sense, declaring that “the educational foundations of our
society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens
our very future as a Nation and a people.”120 This, says Dona Schneider, “was
more than a call for reform - it was a scream.”121 In addition, the 1970s and early
1980s witnessed a growing and increasingly vocal concern about censorship
from within the educational community itself.122 At the juncture of conservative
politics, conservative religion, educational reform efforts, and elevated concerns
regarding censorship, the Gablers suddenly found the work they had done
relatively quietly since 1961 in the national spotlight. Newspapers from the
Washington Post to the Los Angeles Times told the story of how these “two little
Texans” had managed to use their state’s textbook adoption process, which
allowed citizens to voice objections at public hearings prior to official statewide
adoption, to eliminate “material that distorts the Constitution, encourages
119 Diane Ravitch, Left Back: A Century of Failed School Reforms (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 411.
120 National Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation at Risk:
The Imperative for Educational Reform. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1983), 5, http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps3244
/ED226006.pdf (accessed January 8, 2014).
121 Dona Schneider, American Childhood: Risks and Realities (New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1995), 83.
122 After the Phi Delta Kappan, for instance, published article in October
1979 looking with alarm at the proceedings of the past decade, the journal in
1980 devoted an article almost every other monthly issue to the topic of
censorship, as opposed to one or two every other year or so in the decade prior
to that point. An article in the April 1980 issue was the earliest I could find
mentioning the Gablers specifically, and in 1982, the Phi Delta Kappan devoted
the entirety of their October issue to the topic, including publishing an article by
the Gablers themselves.
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evolutionary speculation, undermines the traditional role of the sexes and
promotes secular humanism.”123 Because the Texas State Board of Education
took citizens’ objections seriously, publishers had to as well, and, as one
newspaper article explained, “Because [Texas] is one of 22 states that select
books statewide, what passes muster here sometimes sets a nationwide
standard.”124
Recent scholarship attempting to explain the conservative ascendancy
that inaugurated the Reagan Era has noted the increasing interconnectedness,
developed largely through migration, media, and communication networks, of
people across the United States from the grassroots level and up who, like the
Gablers, came to be identified as part of the “religious Right.”125 Daniel K.
Williams observes that “by the summer of 1980,” old enemies had set aside their
differences, and “the evangelical unity that had seemed impossible to imagine
only two years earlier had become a reality. Fundamentalists, charismatics, and
evangelicals were working together in a political coalition to take the nation back

123 Dan Balz, “Two Little Texans’ in Thick of Textbook Battle for Young
Minds,” The Washington Post. August 16, 1982, http://search.proquest.com
/docview/147421162?accountid=15053 (accessed January 11, 2014). According
Balz’s article, Norma Gabler expressed incredulity at the opposition arising
against “two little Texans,” opposition that included Norman Lear’s lobbying
group People for the American Way and no doubt arose partly because the
spotlight had turned on them at the dawn of the decade.
124 Ibid.
125 See Darren Dochuk’s From Bible Belt to Sunbelt for an excellent and
engaging treatment of this intricate web of relations between South and West in
particular.
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for the cause of Christ.”126 The interconnectedness and new sense of unity
fostered community and simultaneously fed the inflated sense of, in Falwell’s
terms, “majority” status that publications from religious and political conservatives
consistently claimed. In 1982, the Gablers confidently claimed that while “fifteen
to 20 years ago we were rather lonesome in our battle,” they were “now... only
two of many, many concerned individuals across our nation.”127
The fact that they had acquired a much larger audience in the few years
preceding that statement likely fed*both the reality and appearance of an
expanding base of real and potential allies. The Gablers appear to have first hit
national news for the supportive role they played in the explosive textbook
controversy in Kanawha County, West Virginia in 1974. Multiple articles from that
point forward cite the Gablers’ connections to Phyllis Schlafly, the leader of the
anti-ERA campaign and founder of Eagle Forum, and Jerry Falwell’s Moral
Majority. By many accounts, the Gablers’ in-home not-for-profit, Education
Research Analysts, had a mailing list of around 12,000 people at the beginning of
the decade.128 Their visibility increased throughout the early 1980s, as they were
featured in national newspapers as well as on national television shows such as

126 Daniel K. Williams, God’s Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 184.
127 Mel Gabler and Norma Gabler, “Response: Mind Control Through
Textbooks,” The Phi Delta Kappan 64, no. 2 (October 1982), 96.
http://www.jstor.org.proxy.wm.edu/stable/20386583 (accessed May 2, 2013).
128 Journalist Dena Kleiman was among several to report that the Gablers
had “a mailing list of over 12,000 and a staff of seven.” “Influential Couple
Scrutinizes Books for Anti-Americanism,”’ The New York Times, July 14, 1981,
https://proxy.wm.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.proxy.wm.edu/docvie
w/120705749?accountid=15053 (accessed January 11, 2014).
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CBS’s 60 Minutes.129 The Texas couple may have rejoiced over their expanding
base of support, but the new curiosity in the Gablers and their efforts also
triggered deep concern among educators in particular. Expressions of this
concern were often accompanied by outrage over what many understood not just
as censorship efforts that were antithetical to healthy democratic society, but also
as an attempt to undo the gains made toward expanding civil rights and
accepting diversity that marked the decades prior. The reactions in the
mainstream media and in educational journals also revealed, however, a
profound befuddlement over rhetoric that appeared to them as at best logically
inconsistent and at worst blatantly dissembling: without fail, those who, like the
Gablers, were arguing for the removal or revision of “immoral” textbooks insisted
that the real “censors” were elitist “educrats.”130
By 1985 a number of well-publicized court cases centering on the legality
and constitutionality of conservative evangelicals’ concerted efforts to alter public
education were in process, emerging in tandem with quite vocal opposition to
such alterations by parents and educators around the country.131 In addition, the
129 Frank Piasecki’s doctoral dissertation provides an abundant
compilation of media attention given the Gablers, which grew exponentially
around the beginning of the decade. Frank E. Piasecki, “Norma and Mel Gabler:
The Development and Causes of Their Involvement Concerning the Curricular
Appropriateness of School Textbook Content” (PhD diss., North Texas State
University, Denton, 1982).
1 Gabler, Our Children. 99.
131 Joan DelFattore has written an in-depth and passionate exploration of
several of the most well-known court cases involving “fundamentalist ideology”
and public school textbooks, including Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of
Education (1987). Joan DelFattore, What Johnny Shouldn’t Read: Textbook
Censorship in America (New Flaven: Yale University Press, 1992), 3.
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Gablers’ own efforts in Texas had come under increasingly effective opposition,
from Norman Lear’s People for the American Way (P.F.A.W.) in particular.1321
was unable to locate explicit evidence pointing to the Gablers’ motivation for
publishing their book at the particular moment they did. However, the explosion
of interest in the couple at the turn of the decade, and the accompanying
expansion of both support and resistance, strongly suggests that they felt
compelled to speak no longer just to the assumed “majority” who already allied
with their cause, but to persuade the unconvinced to join their efforts and to more
thoroughly address their opponents’ accusations.
The fact that the book was published by a religious press (Victor Press),
contains scattered Bible quotations, and explicitly laments the fundamentalist
“cop-out period” following the Scopes trial in 1925, suggests in part that it was
intended for a conservative evangelical audience, an effort (to echo the Gablers’
own frequent use of militaristic language) to “rally the troops.”133 Yet the frequent
shifts from the rhetorical offense to the rhetorical defense imply another goal, as
well. After calling for the reinstatement of the nineteenth-century McGuffev
132 It appears to be largely because of P.F.A.W.’s involvement that the rule
stating that only opposition to textbooks could be voiced at the hearings was
changed in 1982. See Robert Reinhold, “Textbook Debate Broadens in Texas,”
New York Times. August 3, 1983, http://search.proquest.com/docview
/122305883?accountid=15053 (accessed January 11, 2014).
133 Following the common narrative arch describing the split in the 1940s
between fundamentalists and their more culturally-engaged evangelical
counterparts, the Gablers write, “It was not until after World War II that
conservative, Bible-believing Christians realized their mistake in not having used
their influence to affect education. During this ‘cop-out period,’ ...It became
popular among educators to ignore God, the Bible, the supernatural, the
traditional family, and to regard majority opinion as ‘unprogressive.’” Gabler and
Gabler, Our Children. 30.
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Readers, for instance, the Gablers gently insist, “All we want is good literature
with a wholesome purpose” - a generic-enough agenda that few would be prone
to frown upon such a desire. As if sensing, however, that what equaled “good
literature” and “a wholesome purpose” might be the real issue of debate for their
opponents (and that McGuffev might not pass either test for some) the Gablers
suddenly shift gears to the defensive. “You may think our efforts simply reflect
syrupy, moralistic, middle-class values,” they accuse their reader, quite evidently
a different “you” than that to which their humble submission was made a moment
earlier; “Call them whatever you like. But we guarantee that the use of better
textbooks would improve our schools and increase the likelihood of our children
emerging as good citizens and worthy leaders of the next generation.”134 Such
shifts suggest that the Gablers, by directly addressing (without directly rebutting)
the accusations of those who aligned against their efforts, hoped to convince an
audience beyond those who shared their conservative evangelical faith and
heritage. To do so, however, the Gablers would have to suggest that what was at
stake in this “battle” was something for which everyone would want to fight.
III.

“We Must Save Our Children”135

“Agents of the New Right are everywhere,” proclaimed a 1982 Phi Delta
Kappan article by an alarmed and irate Ben Brodinsky.136 With an odd
combination of echoes, both of anti-McCarthyism and of Cold War scare tactics,
134 Ibid., 95.
135 Ibid., 160.
136 Ben Brodinsky, “The New Right: The Movement and Its Impact,” The
Phi Delta Kappan 64. no. 2 (October 1982): 91,
http://www.jstor.org.proxy.wm.edu/stable/20386581 (accessed May 2, 2013).
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Brodinsky claimed that the nefarious “New Right” was “frightening parents,
spurring them to leaf through schoolbooks to search for a dirty word, an offensive
paragraph,” warning his readers that “they are active on national, state, and local
levels.”137 Brodinsky feared that a vast take-over of public education was in
process, for “while educators’ eyes were on themselves and on the rush of
developments in education and society,” the New Right had gathered enough
steam to “[loose] the dogs of war against public education.”138 This was no minor
battle, either. “The public schools in 1982 are the target of so powerful an attack
that their very existence is in jeopardy,” Brodinsky forewarned; “Radicals of the
New Right are working toward exactly that end, that is, the remaking of the public
schools in the image of the New Right - or else their destruction.”139 For
Brodinsky, the democracy that public education was designed to sustain and
perpetuate, the fate of the more free, more tolerant, and more critically-thinking
American citizenry that the “the rush of developments” had aimed to create, were
the core issues at stake in this battle.
The Gablers, in an article published as a response to Brodinsky’s,
suggested other issues at stake. “A nation that does not teach its values to its
youth,” they wrote, “is committing intellectual suicide.”140 For the Gablers, those
values consisted of the promotion of “monogamous families, antihomosexuality,
anti-abortion, American patriotism, morality, conservative views, teach of

137 Ibid., 91.
138 Ibid., 87.
139 Ibid.
140 Gabler and Gabler, “Mind Control,” 96.
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honesty, obeying laws, changing bad laws through a legal process, etc.”141 Both
Brodinsky and the Gablers’ arguments rest on unspoken assumptions about their
broad persuasiveness. Brodinsky assumed that his audience would agree that
“inject[ing] into each child’s curriculum large doses of biblical material” and
“transmitting] facts, concepts, and attitudes on the rightness of Victorian morality
[and] free enterprise” are problematic enterprises for public educators teaching a
diverse student population.142 The Gablers assumed that that same audience
would agree that their list exemplified the “basic foundational values,” which they
term “Judeo-Christian” values and ethics, “upon which our nation was founded,”
and therefore the truly “American way” that ought to prevail in public
education.143 The unspoken argument between Brodinsky and the Gablers, then,
was one over the accuracy of their equations and the appropriateness of
applying them throughout public education. Yet, as if they were aware that their
list of values might not be a widely-shared “common ground,” the Gablers
attempted to offer an alternative point of agreement, a technique they used again
throughout What Are They Teaching Our Children? Not only did they, in this
article and in their book, insist that the America’s future is at stake, the Gablers
insisted as well that the stakes involved were ones in which “the matter of
parental rights is basic,” and were stakes that therefore, as the title of their essay

141 Ibid
142
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(“Mind Control Through Textbooks”) insinuates, were over the immediate well
being of the bearers of that future - children themselves.144
The Gablers could expect references to the vulnerability of children to be
emotionally affective precisely because of a continuing Romantic tradition of
viewing young people as inherently innocent and childhood as peculiarly sacred.
Sally Shuttleworth locates the beginning of this widespread cultural
“sacralization” of children with the “Romantic writers [who] had established a cult
of the child,” a trend that only expanded over the next century.145 Viviana Zelizer
writes of the emergence around the turn of the twentieth century of the
“economically ‘worthless’ but emotionally ‘priceless’ child,” an expansion of the
“cultural process of ‘sacralization’ of children’s lives.”146 As Richard Lowry
suggests in his work on Lewis Hine’s child-labor photography, Progressive-era
projects often depended heavily on the image of this “priceless” child, helping to
establish a tradition of utilizing the affective quality of such images to emotionally,
even if not rationally, persuade.147 We can observe the Gablers’ effort to

145 Sally Shuttleworth, The Mind of the Child: Child Development in
Literature. Science, and Medicine. 1840-1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2010 ), 1 .

146 Viviana Zelizer, Pricing the Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value
of Children (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) 3, 11.
147 “By making the child’s body visible for inspection,” Lowry argues, “Hine
brought into powerful conjunction two discourses - public concerns of
progressive reform and the personal, even intimate imaginings of modern
childhood... his images thrust the sacred child of the late-Victorian bourgeois
home into the glare of the public sphere as the object of social action.” Richard
Lowry, “Lewis Hine’s Family Romance,” in The American Child, ed. Caroline
Levander and Carol Singley (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press,
2003), 186.
68

implement this rhetorical strategy even in the title of their book, What Are They
Teaching Our Children? The title directly addresses parents, appealing to their
sense of responsibility for protecting their children. The title’s form as a question
is vaguely ominous, the unidentified “they” threatening if only for the subject’s
very ambiguity, the presence of the possessive “our” suggesting trespass or
violation. The Gablers’ clear attempt to inspire outrage against “Mind Control
Through Textbooks” (as the title of their 1982 article responding to Brodinsky
phrases it) relies perhaps most heavily on the emotional appeal of the final word
- “children.” Children are in danger, their book’s front cover announces, and
parents have a responsibility - and a right - to protect them.
Childhood, the Romantics and their descendants would say, is sacred, in
the Durkheim-ian sense of something one ought to “protect and isolate.”148 It is a
life stage that ought to be untainted by too-early introductions to the realities of
adulthood. In their chapter “Lessons in Despair,” the Gablers begin with a
statement that follows in this tradition. “If you think children read only bright,
wholesome, happy poems and stories in school,” they warn, “think again.”149 This
is, however, a chapter arguing in part against the trend toward “realism” in public
school curricula, a trend that included the effort to recognize that schoolchildren
did not all experience the same “reality.” A story that to others may have
appeared to simply to describe “violence, crime and rebellion” was in the

148 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans.
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Gablers’ perception equivalent to a story that advocated those things.150 Their
gestures toward protecting the sacred space of childhood, then, suggest an effort
to establish a level of agreement between themselves and those uncertain of the
validity of their dominate equation. What kind of parent wouldn’t, the Gablers
imply, want their children’s youth to be a space kept “bright, wholesome, [and]
happy”? If, the logic goes, the choice is only between children being “shocked
and shaken instead of being taught the moral and cultural principles on which
America was founded,” any reasonable parent would choose the latter.151
The Gablers’ use of the childhood-as-sacred-space trope is also evident in
their chapter arguing against “Miseducation in Sex.”152 Expressing their concern
about what they perceived to be inappropriate amounts and kinds of sexual
information given to children, the Gablers appeal first to one “Dr. Rhoda Lorand,
a respected New York clinical psychologist... who has written and studied
extensively in the field of childhood sexuality, [and who] outlines these programs’
potential harms.”153 The Gablers use their interpretation of Lorand’s work to
momentarily switch gears away from identifying the key problem as being (what
is to them) the fact that “sex education in curriculum [sic] gives legitimacy to
immorality.”154 Rather, they attempt to appeal to those who may not share their
“Judeo-Christian” sense of morality - as emphasizing sexual abstinence outside
of heterosexual marriage - by shifting their argument toward the way in which the
150 Ibid.,
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educational establishment views the child: “The creators of these [sex-ed]
programs regard the child as a miniature adult and therefore present him with
facts, concepts, and demands for self-appraisal which are not in harmony with
the developmental levels of the child and therefore disturb normal
development.”155 For the purposes of their argument against sex education, the
Gablers appeal to a psychology that supports firm boundaries around the
amounts and kinds of sexual information given children. Because, according the
Gabler’s reasoning, children are not “miniature adults,” what people like Ben
Brodinsky label “censorship” is really protection from “the kind of sex-ed now
being given to our children [that] is causing far more harm than good,” if for no
other reason than that it invades the sacred space of childhood.156
The problem, however, with “what they are teaching our children,” to
rephrase the Gablers’ title, was for them a much more serious issue than one of
merely age-inappropriate material. Over and over, the Gablers insist that
educational materials that refuse to “make moral judgments over whether certain
behavior is right or wrong,” judgments that align with the “Judeo-Ghristian ethic”
that the Gablers describe, are inevitably encouraging what is “wrong.”157 Again,
however, as if to express the seriousness of the battle in terms those who might
disagree with the ethic they describe could appreciate, the Gablers repeatedly
suggest that public schools’ failure to promote that moral ethic puts all children in
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grave danger. In their chapter “Children Adrift,” for instance, the Gablers open
with what they describe as a “parable” of the current state of public education:
So the children are launched in their frail little boats while their parents
stay home with mixed feelings. Most parents - remembering the wise
guidance they had when setting out on their voyage of life - trust the
schools implicitly. But some have heard disquieting reports: the schools
have changed; children are being poorly equipped for this voyage.
Students are being sent on their own without maps or a compass. But
these troubled parents cannot afford to moor their children in safer ports.
So they must, by law, send their children to this marina and trust that all
will be well.
The children are launched. The instructors fly overhead in
helicopters, gauging their progress. Look, there’s little Johhny [sic],
headed toward an underwater reef. His boat will smash! He could be
drowned! But don’t worry, an instructor sees him and surely will wave him
back. Wait! Has the instructor gone mad? He is telling Johnny, “Keep
going in the direction you feel is right!”158
One of the Gablers’ fairly reasonable operative assumptions behind this “parable”
is that no caring parent would wish their child to be kept in a place where
“drowning” would be all but a foregone conclusion. Nor would any reasonable,
loving parent be expected to tolerate their child undergoing “Mental Child Abuse,”
as one chapter, denouncing the godlessness of curricula like the controversy158 Ibid., 98-99.
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ridden Man. A Course of Study (MACOS), is entitled.159 The Gablers go further
still when they quote a friend and colleague who apparently equated requiring
children to read textbooks that did not promote the “Judeo-Christian ethic” with
“intellectual rape.”160 Not only is public education in its current state a kind of
violence against children, though. The Gablers argue that the lack of clear
definitions of right and wrong in public school curricula leads to self-inflicted
violence as well. The Gablers insist that it is “no wonder Johnny and Jane are
confused. At home they are taught one thing, at school they are led to question
family mores and decide their own values. Psychologically, this causes
frustration. Is it any wonder teenage suicides have escalated?”161 The leap from
having to “decide their own values” to “teenage suicides” may not be an intuitive
one for most, but such highly-charged language used to describe the setting in
which vulnerable young children spend much of their time, and the supposed
consequences of such a setting, suggests high stakes indeed for the “battle” over
textbook content. The rhetoric of danger and violence toward children at one
level communicates the Gablers’ own evident belief that the stakes were very
159 Diane Ravitch explains that “controversy over [MACOS], an NSFfunded anthropology course used in the upper elementary grades, brought the
entire NSF curriculum-development effort under congressional scrutiny in 1976.
Like other new curricula, MACOS was innovative in its content, its methodology,
and its pedagogy...As the course began to be broadly disseminated, it came
under attack in widely scattered communities by conservative critics who
objected to its subject matter and its cultural relativism... MACOS survived the
criticisms and challenges, but its notoriety” signaled the end of its broad
implementation. Diane Ravitch, The Troubled Crusade: American Education.
1945-1980 (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 264.
160 Gabler and Gabler, Our Children. 106
161 Ibid., 154.
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high. It is also clearly calculated to incite as-yet un-persuaded parents to action,
parents who might differ over the inherent goodness of the Gablers’ “JudeoChristian ethic,” but who would not argue that protecting children was a parent’s
responsibility and right.
A problem persists however, with the Gablers’ particular understanding of
those parental rights. “Isn’t it about time,” they wrote in their response to Ben
Brodinsky, “that parents regained the right to the minds of their children?”162
Textbooks, they insist, and public education more generally, should correspond
with the moral perspective parents wish to pass on to their children. Shelley Burtt
reminds us, “Adult rule over children is so widespread that an effort to explain or
justify it might seem beside the point: part of what it means to be a child is to be
subject to the authority of adults.”163 Yet, as Burtt also points out, “there is little
consensus in either real-world or scholarly debates concerning the nature and
extent of such authority,” and any assertion of parental rights contains a level of
ambiguity about the “nature and extent” of adult rule.164 The Gablers’ writing
conveys a strong sense of parental rights being the primacy of parents’ interests
and beliefs over the state’s and child’s. They argue repeatedly that any
curriculum that “encouraged questioning of parental authority” or “suggested
students form their own values, independent of the home” was a violation of their
162 Gabler and Gabler, “Mind Control,” 96.
163 Shelley Burtt, “The Proper Scope of Parental Authority: Why We Don’t
Owe Children an ‘Open Future,”’ in Child. Family, and State, ed. Stephen
Macedo and Iris Marion Young, (New York: New York University Press, 2003),
243.
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rights as parents.165 The couples’ particular understanding of parental rights is
clearly rooted in a hierarchical notion of authority, and of family authority in
particular. This emphasis on proper order has been central to conservative
evangelical theology, and would, therefore, be attractive primarily to those who
already adhered to that theology.166 In a clear effort to grab the attention of an
audience wider than those who already agreed with them, however, the Gablers
often attempt to wrap their vision for public school education in packaging that
would be more broadly attractive. Language drawing upon the Romantic vision of
the child - language that emphasizes the sacred space of childhood and
children’s vulnerability through emotionally-charged accusations of violence and
abuse - peppers the Gablers’ arguments. Their gestures toward that rhetorical
tradition, however, suggests their awareness not just of the limited appeal of their
version of “Judeo Christian values,” but also of their emphasis upon a Godordained hierarchical order that would allow them to have absolute control over
what their children believed.
What is evident after even a brief textual analysis is that “common ground”
available to the Gablers and their not-yet allies remained strikingly small. If
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166 “Dispensationalism,” a theory regarding end times and a core
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obedience. It defined sin as ‘disorder’ and rebellion against God’s rule as a latterday sign of religious apostasy and social anarchy... fundamentalists, and neo
evangelicals as well,... had long upheld morally grounded homes as the best
proof of their separation from the world and the last Christian line of defense
against the inherent disorder of secular systems.” Bendroth, Fundamentalism
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“surrendering their own flesh and blood” is what public education demanded of all
parents, the Gablers would most likely be quite right in their assertion that few
parents would be willing to do so.167 The problem lies in the fact that to reach
even that level of agreement, the Gablers’ opponents would have to also accept
a wide array of unspoken premises. These include, to name a few, that “realism”
is equal to promoting violence and hatred, that failure to instruct children in
parents’ understandings of right and wrong in the public school setting was
equivalent to child abuse, and that the transmission of parents’ values was
something to be pursued at the cost of access to knowledge and the
development of critical thinking skills. The Gablers argued that childhood should
be kept a sacred space by filling it with only “positive” examples and prohibiting
access to “adult” knowledge. They insisted as well that limiting information to
prescriptive declarations of right and wrong behavior were essential to protecting
vulnerable children. Vulnerable children are nonetheless future adults and
citizens. Edwin Darden states concisely the political significance of public
education: “Children are impressionable. They are viewed by adults as the future.
By shaping their thoughts and directing their values, the theory goes, one can
change the world for years hence.”168 According to Dona Schneider, “childhood
became entrenched as an American institution” after World War Two, “a postwar
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metaphor for the idealized human nature Americans wished to see in
themselves.”169 The problem was that what exactly constituted that “idealized
human nature” proved to be the debate around which the Gablers and their
opponents skirted.
IV.

Claiming the “American Way”: Translation Problems

The 1980s, as noted earlier, began with intense concern over the fate of
public education in the United States. As Diane Ravitch notes, “The nation’s
schools were at the center of many of the social upheavals of this era... At this
crucial moment, with schools trying (often reluctantly) to comply with the
demands of the civil rights movement and with court decisions, along came
pressures from the radical and countercultural movements to change the
curriculum and the very nature off schooling.” 170 Public education was a topic of
national concern and conversation, and citizens of all religions heard the
message proclaimed loudly in the title of the 1983 report - the nation, and all that
America stood for, was at risk. To argue that one’s agenda represented an
attempt to preserve all that America stood for, then, was a timely rhetorical move,
and one the Gablers pursue in their book with gusto. But it was a rhetorical move
that required deciding beforehand just what America stood for - a matter of
perpetual debate, but a debate in which the Gablers, if their writing is any
indication, felt no need to join. They knew what America stood for. “JudeoChristian” values were “American” values, and vice versa. The text suggests that
169 Schneider, American Childhood, 3.
170 Ravitch, Left Back, 367.
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while they were leery of depending solely on this equivalency to persuade a
broad range of fellow Americans, the Gablers remained unwilling or unable to
question the equation directly. As a result, their arguments in their book depend
heavily on their efforts to use, in Habermas’ phrase again, other “generally
accessible language” equating other, less religiously-charged concepts with the
essence of “America.”
Educator Charles Park, writing in the election year of 1980, succinctly
expressed what many others had silently assumed about this Cold War-era battle
over public education:
Beyond the political rhetoric of left or right, Republican or Democrat, liberal
or conservative, lies an arena of agreement about American education. In
our pluralistic society we agree on the right of students to learn to think for
themselves, to have access to information, and to respect the rights of
others to hold alternative views. Such are the dimensions of freedom in
our land and in our classrooms. Few nations are prepared to trust children
to become humane, independent thinkers... As our nation renews political
debate during this election year, we can hope for a reaffirmation of support
for the tenets of democratic schools. A commitment to the goals of
freedom and democracy appears to be very much in order.171

171 J. Charles Park, “The New Right: Threat to Democracy in Education,”
Educational Leadership (November 1980): 146,
http://web.ebscohost.com. proxy.wm.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=12&sid=
66fd3edf-f5c6-4a55-acf5-eff602cc1a61%40sessionmgr4004&hid=4212
(accessed January 11, 2014).
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Park’s driving assumption in this passage is that the debate over public
education will begin in an “arena of agreement” about the “tenets of democratic
schools” in a “pluralistic society.” But the implications of this assumption are
significant. Those who disagree with Park’s order of priorities - that education is
first and foremost about achieving the goals of “freedom and democracy” - and
his definitions of those two things are effectively disregarded as potential
participants in the debate. In subtly-charged terms reflecting the Cold War binary
that imagined political states as limited to either democracy or communism,
Park’s language implies that those who do not share a “commitment to the goals
of freedom and democracy” - as he understood them - are therefore anti
democratic and therefore anti-American.
It was arguments like Park’s to which the Gablers were in part attempting
to provide an alternative in What Are They Teaching Our Children? But the very
ideas that comprised the “arena of agreement” Park presumed upon were
precisely the ideas that the Gablers found unconscionable. It was the very
insistence upon “the right of students to learn to think for themselves, to have
access to information, and to respect the rights of others to hold alternative
views” - those things that were the essence of Park’s “American way” - that
threatened the “America” the Gablers wished to protect. “America,” the Gablers
agree with those like Park, is about freedom, but it is freedom, or “liberty,”
founded upon “Judeo-Christian principles,” and it must therefore be defined
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within the framework of those principles and the strict moral code that
accompanied them.172
Throughout their book, however, the Gablers seem uncertain about which
rhetorical tactics would be most persuasive. Indeed, they appear to recognize
that some Americans may not hold to their version of “Judeo-Christian” religious
principles at all, and that an argument intended to persuade more than those who
do will require limiting their demands. “We’re not asking for in-school catechisms
and Bible lessons,” the Gablers insist, in a clear gesture to imply that they accept
“alterative views.”173 Nevertheless, “we do protest our children’s textbooks being
used as channels for attacks on biblical beliefs and Judeo-Christian morals.
This,” they insist, “clearly violates the First Amendment.”174 Appealing to First
Amendment rights, however, leaves a much smaller space for the perpetuation of
“Judeo-Christian morals” than does arguing that those morals are the foundation
of the American ideal, and their insistence that they don’t want “in-school
catechisms and Bible lessons” in public schools reads as contradictory and
perhaps disingenuous in light of their repeated argument that it is the very
absence of those things that signals the disintegration of the “America” for which
they advocate.
The Gablers wield a number of other rhetorical strategies that suggest an
effort to present their textbook reform efforts in terms appealing to more than
those who shared their vision for “America.” Forinstance, in their arguments
172 Gabler, Our Children. 33.
173 Ibid., 38.
174 Ibid., 39.
80

against sex education in public schools, the Gablers address accusations of the
partisan nature of their view. While “the sexologists and their allies in education
would have you believe that only political and religious conservatives are against
sex education in public schools,” according to the Gablers, this simply isn’t
true.175 Even renowned pediatrician “Dr. Benjamin Spock,” they submit, whom
they rightly noted “could hardly be included” among “political and religious
conservatives,” argued that “sexual intimacy” was, at the very least, a “serious
and spiritual matter.”176 Obviously, the Gablers implied, there was a degree of
bipartisan solidarity about this issue that ought to help persuade those who did
not identify as “conservatives” to rethink their stance. Reiterating common
complaints against the public education system and echoing the concerns in A
Nation at Risk, the Gablers also implied that their efforts countered the declining
intellectual quality of public education curricula. The Gablers begin by expressing
a shared concern over textbooks’ lack of intellectual rigor. “Textbooks have been
‘dumbed down,”’ the Gablers explained. “They’ve been made less difficult
because students can’t handle harder material.”177 The future employment of
American children was at risk as well, but less because of “academic ineptness”
and more because of unspecified “rotten attitudes.”178
Whatever cross-party alliance against sex-education might have existed,
however many people agreed that public education’s intellectual quality had

175 Ibid., 77.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid., 20.
178 Ibid., 21.
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degraded, the “generically accessible language” upon which the Gablers depend
most heavily throughout the entirety of their book is that which directly counters
people like Park. Park was advocating an educational system that would protect
the pluralistic character of American society by creating space for minorities to
express “alternative views” - a project that would of necessity not allow majority
opinion to close that space. The Gablers, however, prioritized citizens’ status as
taxpayers and the rights of the majority to argue the following: “Humanism
teaches the religion of moral relativism, because it accepts on faith the principle
that all morals are relative. This violates, in tax-supported education, the JudeoChristian moral principles of the great majority of Americans,” and is therefore
un-American.179 Not a statement calculated to welcome in the uninitiated - by
default those very minorities left as of yet outside of the “majority” fold - this
statement nonetheless succinctly captures the thesis of their work. The violation
of the majority view (and therefore the American one) is what truly, in the
Gablers’ view, puts the nation at risk. The couple’s outlook for the future is a
gloomy one. “If moral or ethical relativism continues to be taught unchecked in
American schools,” the Gablers forewarn, “we will drift first into anarchy then into
a totalitarianism [sic]. And we, who protest relativism in textbooks, are the ones
who are compared to the Nazis!”180
For the Gablers, prioritizing education as a moral and spiritual enterprise
defined as “Judeo-Christian” put them from the start outside of the “arena of

179 Ibid., 100.
180 Ibid., 103.
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agreement” assumed, by those such as Charles Park, as the common ground
from which all arguments about public education would proceed. In order to
engage in that conversation, then, and in a clear effort to persuade those less
certain of America’s “Judeo-Christian” character than they, the Gablers regularly
used terms from the democratic linguistic arsenal - appeals to the rights of the
majority, religious freedom, taxpayer status. Their “America” was unfortunately a
vastly different “America” than the one Park described, one unlikely to persuade
anyone beyond those already inclined to accept the veracity of the Gablers’
vision. If the debate in which they wished to participate was articulated in terms
of “democracy” and “American values,” however, the Gablers, in order not to
compromise their own “Judeo-Christian” perspective, would have translate that
perspective into “generally accessible language” while (re)defining “democracy”
and “American” values in terms that would allow them to keep the “bit of the
frame,” to reiterate Jonathan Glover’s phrase, they were unable to bend. But
what precise “bit of the frame” was that?
V.

The Problem of Sainthood

The Gablers, at least in their published writings, tended to avoid explicitly
identifying themselves as religious or religiously-motivated. This was most
certainly a decision made at least in part to try to avoid the frequent accusations
of religious partisanship and fanaticism thrown their way. The implications of
being understood as “education apostles of the fundamentalist right,” as one
reporter labeled the couple, were serious, rhetorical strategies intended to point
out the u/7-representativeness of the Gablers’ views and efforts, ways to mark the
83

couple as either quaint or potentially dangerous.181 Thus, the few places in which
the Gablers do make explicit statements about their religious affiliation are
important and revealing. According to one reporter, the Gablers were “members
of a Baptist group called the Christian and Missionary Alliance,” and they
understood “their textbook work in missionary terms.”182 Frank Piasecki, in a
1982 doctoral dissertation, mentioned that “Mel Gabler simply states that
Educational Research Analysts is operated as a faith missionary organization,”
trusting God’s financial provision for endeavors the couple were certain that He
sanctioned.183 These admissions suggest that the Gablers’ work might be
fruitfully examined through the lens of a theological tradition tracing its roots back
to the unique characteristics of early twentieth-century fundamentalism. Margaret
181 Alison Muscatine, a reporter for the Washington Post, began her article
about these “apostles” with the following description articulating both the sense
that the Gablers’ efforts were provincial and simultaneously ominous: “The retired
East Texas grandparents captivated their audience of 50 - who had paid $15
each for a day-long seminar and a country luncheon of ham, turkey and mash
potatoes - with their homespun, ‘plain folk’ sermon against the evils of secular
humanism and the absence of traditional American and Christian values in the
schools.” Somewhat cute and homey, the imagery implies, the Gablers in
Muscatine’s view, while successful in their “censorship” efforts elsewhere, were
nonetheless “not likely to get a foothold in Maryland,” where their “country
luncheon” took place. Alison Muscatine, “Couple Brings Textbook Crusade to
Frederick.” The Washington Post. October 16, 1983, http://search.proquest.com
/docview/147600180?accountid=15053 (accessed January 11, 2014).
182 William Trombley, “Educators Fear Rising Tide of Textbook
Censorship.” Los Angeles Times. February 14, 1982, http://search.proquest.com
/docview/153038034?accountid=15053 (accessed January 11, 2014).
183 “With his strong devout belief, he further indicates that God supplies all
their needs with most contributions being received in small amounts. To his
critics who do not believe that such could be the case, he acknowledges this
would be a big obstacle to overcome. As no donations are guaranteed from one
year to the next the Gablers attest that they must ‘look to the Lord for funding.’”
Piasecki, “Gabler,” 78-79.
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Bendroth, in her landmark study Fundamentalism and Gender, observes that
“fundamentalism emerged from a revivalist tradition.”184 Although the
fundamentalism whose history Bendroth describes originated in the North, she
recognizes that “its message resonated with the cultural Christianity of the
American South,” and beginning in the 1920s the two traditions began to
intersect and overlap, divide and reunite, both theologically and regionally, until,
by the 1980s, it became most useful to use an umbrella term such as the one I
prefer, “conservative evangelical.”185 Darren Dochuk argues that the phrase
“revivalist” is an equally apt description for what he calls “southern
evangelicalism,” as well.186 This proselytizing, mission-oriented mindset made
those conservative evangelicals’ religious and political endeavors inseparable.187
This history offers, then, not so much an alternative as much as a
complementary explanation of the Gablers’ silence about their religious identity
and motivation. For the Gablers, as for so many other southern evangelicals,
political endeavors were not just inseparable from religious ones, however.
Political endeavors, like every endeavor, could only be understood as at their
core spiritual ones, to be aimed first and foremost at the perpetuation and
spreading of the faith.
184 Bendroth, Fundamentalism and Gender, 6.
185 Ibid., 4.
186 Dochuk, Bible Belt. 17.
187 Ibid. “Driven by a sense of guardianship over their culture, and
energized by the universal potential of personal conversion, evangelicals in the
western South,” including Texas, “folded the teachings of Jesus and Jefferson
[into a formula for participatory politics. Unlike evangelicals in the Deep South
who fashioned themselves the last great bulwark of Christian democracy, they
looked confidently upon themselves as its last great vanguard.” Ibid.
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There are at least two presuppositions behind the Gablers’ arguments that
are clearly identifiable with conservative evangelicalism and its fundamentalist
origins. The first is their acceptance of the equation of “facts” with “truth.” The
second is their insistence that there is only one absolute and indisputable truth
applicable to all areas of life, which they, as believers in the Bible, possess. The
conflation of “fact” with “truth” is a belief rooted in the emphasis on and peculiar
understanding of order that is so unique to fundamentalist-influenced traditions.
Nancy Ammerman, in her study of one particular fundamentalist church, notes
that “Believers do not like living with uncertainty. When they have a question,
they want an answer... In contrast to the chaos of the outside world, the
believer’s life is full of order. The ideological world in which [believers] live comes
with a detailed and well-marked road map for living the Christian life.”188 A desire
or valuing of order is not by itself a religiously partisan position; but the
implications of the idea of order Ammerman describes are very much religiously
partisan. This fundamentalist concept incorporates not just structure, but the
assurance of knowable and stable answers - the accessibility of absolute truth and “knowing what is right and wrong, what is God’s plan and what is not,
provides a structure that believers treasure.”189 Most importantly, understanding
the Bible as “a detailed and well-marked road for living the Christian life” leaves
no area of life, including politics and education, beyond the reach of those
assured answers.
188

Nancy Ammerman, Bible Believers: Fundamentalists in the Modern
World (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1987), 41
U9 Ibid., 42.
86

Tellingly, in the Gablers’ declension narrative of public education, they
accuse “liberal theologians” who around the turn of the twentieth century “used
the methods of German ‘higher criticism’ to attack the authority and authenticity
of the Bible,” of leading the country and its educators away from “American”
values.190 This is a historical reference that not only helps confirm their
identification with the fundamentalist movement that grew largely out of a
reaction to German higher criticism, but also helps reveal the limited reach of
their definition of even “Judeo-Christian” values.191 As implied throughout this
paper, the Gablers’ use of this 1950s-era phrase to suggest a kind of religious
lowest common denominator between them and followers of other faiths. By
excluding “liberal theologians” (as well as Jews and Catholics, the other primary
religious groups referenced in this phrase) from the supposedly broad swath of
people the phrase by itself implies, however, the Gablers effectively limit the
definition of “Judeo-Christian” to the viewpoint shared by evangelicals following in
the fundamentalist vein.
9

We see the consequences of this limitation play out in the Gablers’
understanding of history in particular. Nancy Ammerman notes that the
fundamentalist believers she studied “not only claim special knowledge about
their own lives but also claim to understand the history and future of humankind.
What they know about the past is that God is the author of everything, and his
truth is unchanging... what is stable and familiar is more likely to be ‘godly’ than
190 Gabler and Gabler, Our Children. 28.
191 Ibid., 28.
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something new and different.”192 The past is then, for the heirs of early twentiethcentury fundamentalism, always closer to the “truth,” to the way things ought to
be, while the present appears to. inevitably be in a state of decline. The equation
of the “facts” of the past that are most familiar with “truth,” with all its connotations
of moral good and stable meaning, occurs throughout the Gablers’ book, from
the introduction to the Gabler’s book onward. James C. Hefley recounts how the
Gablers originally became involved with the Texas textbook adoption process,
explaining, “Mel and Norma have been concerned about textbooks since the day
in 1961 when their sixteen-year-old son, Jim, insisted they take a look at his
history book... Mel and Norma compared the book to older history texts and
reached a startling conclusion: History hadn’t changed, but the publishers sure
had changed history.”193 This passage suggests that the reality that textbooks
had changed - perhaps even more than what specifically had changed signaled to the Gablers degeneracy. Their “conclusion” is that truth had been
exchanged for falsehood - “history hadn’t changed, but the publishers sure had
changed history.”
The Gablers’ insistence that there is any sort of “absolute truth” about
history would, of course, strike most contemporary historians as absurd. There
are, of course, historical explanations for the roots of this quite common
assumption that history is simply a collection of indisputable “facts,” rather than,
what is commonly accepted among present-day historians, a narrative that is
192 Ammerman, Bible Believers, 43.
193 Gabler and Gabler, Our Children, 10.
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inevitably shaped by the “personal opinions of the writers.”194 As Jonathan
Zimmerman persuasively argues in his examination of textbook debates
throughout the twentieth century, while “historians have engaged in a rich
debate” over how to interpret American history, schoolchildren have long been
presented with a version of history that elides the debates over interpretations
and falsely suggests that such questions were “settled... long ago.”195 Thus, for a
couple who had themselves been through the public education system (and who
had had no further education in institutions in which Zimmerman’s “rich debates”
would have occurred) to retain a belief in a static and idealized sense of the
American past should come as no surprise. Yet the equation of a (familiar)
historical “fact” with a positive moral good is perhaps less expected, at least until
we identify what presuppositions must be accepted to have that equation make
sense. Charles Park was completely accurate in his articulation of “the argument”
that many in the religious Right “advanced”: “when education is presented
without reference to the truth as given by God, the schools in effect teach
students to become atheists.”196 For the fundamentalists that Ammerman studied
and for the Gablers, there simply was no such thing as a morally neutral “fact.”
There is, for those like the Gablers, only truth or falsehood, good or evil, and
students must have a “map” to help them navigate toward the truth.
194 Ibid., 49.
195 Jonathan Zimmerman, Whose America? Culture Wars in the Public
Schools (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 222-223.
196 Charles Park, “Preachers, Politics, and Public Education: A Review of
Right-Wing Pressures against Public Schooling in America,” The Phi Delta
Kappan 61, no. 9 (May 1980): 609, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20385640
(accessed November 7, 2013).
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The dualistic character of the fundamentalist perception of reality emerges
in the Gablers’ regular insistence that “they are not censors or ‘book burners,’” a
denial frequently accompanied in the same breath by their proud affirmation that
“over the years they have had considerable success in pressuring textbook
publishers to excise portions of books they find objectionable....”197 These
apparently contradictory claims caused understandable confusion in the national
press coverage of the Gablers’ efforts. Yet the Gablers’ writing suggests that this
contradiction was in part evidence of their recognition that persuasion
necessitates some compromise and tolerance for other views. They claimed
repeatedly throughout What Are They Teaching Our Children? that they
“welcome discussion - when students are given adequate information on both
sides. We want balance. We simply object to one-sided indoctrination to suit the
ideology of the educational establishment.”198 On the surface this sounds fair, but
in the context of the rest of their rhetoric, a self-contradiction again emerges.
Their firm insistence that they are “not against intellectual inquiry” is not
contradictory //their readers accept their obliquely-stated premise - “intellectual
inquiry” is only valid as long as it occurs within the framework of “biblical beliefs
and Judeo-Christian values.”199 The key to their logic thus lies in the phrase “both
sides” - for the Gablers, there are only ever two choices. The choice as the
Gablers articulate it is between a worldview rooted in a particular understanding

197 Muscatine, “Textbook Crusade.”
198 Gabler and Gabler, Our Children. 60.
199 Ibid., 100.
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of the Bible-which is fully-revealed, non-negotiable, universally-applicable
absolute truth - and a worldview that is rooted in anything else.
The equation of older ways of doing things with better ways of doing
things emerges in the section headlined, “The Results of Poor Textbooks.”200
This is the section referenced earlier that begins with concerns over intellectual
rigor and employment preparation. It takes a rapid turn toward darker matters,
however, when the Gablers compare two lists comparing “the top offenses of
public school students in the 1940s” and the top offenses of students in the
1980s.201 Around World War Two, offenses were evidently benign, consisting of
petty violations like “talking,” “chewing gum,” and “running in the halls.”202 “Forty
years later,” the Gablers claim, public school students ‘ “top offenses” included
things like “rape,” and “murder,” as well “pregnancies,” “suicide,” “gang warfare,”
and “venereal disease.”203 The racialized character of this list is obvious,
resonating with the Gablers’ disapproval of integration in particular, disapproval
that is evident in other areas of the book.204 Yet what is also important about
these two lists is the way in which they illuminate the commonality the Gablers
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201 The Gablers’ footnote describes this list as one gathered from “private
research.” Ibid., 23.
202 Ibid., 21.
203 Ibid., 22.
204 Perhaps the most explicit racism comes in the Gablers’ complaints
regarding “change” that appear to allude to busing: “Here’s how it works. The
educational social planners map out a program - say, to help ‘protected’ middleclass suburban children empathize with the lifestyles and problems of the inner
city... The program is operating before most parents even know what’s going
on.” Later on they ask, outraged, “Since when is a small segment of society the
‘real’ world?” Ibid., 123, 170.
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presumed was behind all that was “wrong” with public education. Integration and
the civil rights movement clearly rubbed them wrong, and the racist assumptions
behind their language are undeniable. That very language and the comparison
between the two lists suggests, though, that the Gablers would likely have found
accusations of “racism” as incomprehensible as they found accusations of
“censorship,” however greatly they felt the pejorative quality of both. If we take
them at their word, then what their rhetoric reveals is that for the Gablers, the
issue was not, in the end, about race or even about censorship. Rather, their
rhetoric implies that they persisted in understanding and framing projects like
integration - a project many hailed as a long-withheld achievement of “American”
values - as one sign among many of a much deeper, and essentially spiritual,
problem. While willing to nod to conversations concerned with intellectual
development and job preparation in order to build rapport with a wider audience,
they could not leave for long what concerned them most - the apparent fall from
an earlier state of innocence, a state represented by the 1940s list of offenses.
There was for the Gablers one single trend of moral degeneracy, a fall to which
integration contributed.
The arguments in What Are They Teaching Our Children? rest upon
premises that derive from the tenets of twentieth century Protestant
fundamentalism. For the Gablers, the battle over education was in its most basic
form a battle over two simple issues - right and wrong. “Two religions” - and only
two - “are in mortal combat for the souls and futures of our children and nation.
One reverences God and the moral values of the Judeo-Christian Bible. The
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other rejects God and the Judeo-Christian basis of the American family.”205 There
are no other options. Furthermore, “change” is itself an echo of the Genesis Fall,
humanity’s rejection once more of an ideal reality already revealed and known by
those who choose to believe it. “‘Change’” the Gablers observed, “is the battle
cry of ‘progressive’ educators. Society, they tell us, is changing. Religions,
governments, mores and morals - all are changing. Nothing is stable,
permanent, eternal. No institution, idea, or loyalty ever remains static.”206 For
many observers, such change was a positive good; for others, it was simply a
neutral acknowledgement of reality. For the Gablers, however, the fact of change
and the fact that it was being encouraged, were signs of a threat that cut to the
very core of their worldview - their belief that absolute truth existed, that it was
eternal and all-encompassing, and that they held it in their possession. This was
the “wire” they could not bend.
VI.

Conclusion

What, finally, can the awkward tension in James C. Hefley’s phrasing,
“saints or censors,” teach us about the particular historical moment at the
beginning of the Reagan Era, and what can it teach us about religion and
religious communities? The phrase is at one level purely descriptive, accurately
assessing how the Gablers perceived their own efforts (“saints”) versus their
opponents in the media and public education in particular understood them
(“censors”). What Are They Teaching Our Children? is also a compilation of
205 Ibid., 160.
206 Ibid., 115.
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common religious Right reactions against “liberal” social trends. Barely-veiled
protest against racial integration, distaste for anything smelling of “big
government” or “Communism” (most often conflated), alarm at the growing
visibility of and influence of “gays,” and a clear aversion to the feminist movement
pervade their writing. Accusations of racism, McCarthyism, homophobia, and
misogyny have hounded those on the religious Right, and with reason. However
well-founded and even accurate those accusations, a close reading of the
Gablers’ rhetoric suggests that those accusations and the scholarly
investigations pursuing those threads, however profitable in other respects, do
little to explain the reasons why the Gablers, among many others, could with
such apparent sincerity unwaveringly persist in denying those and similar
accusations, or at least their pejorative connotations. I argue that understanding
key components of fundamentalist thinking illuminates the fact that what for
others were the issues in the religious Right’s efforts to alter public education
were important but secondary ones for the Gablers - mere manifestations of a
single, deeper, and essentially spiritual trend, one with potentially catastrophic
consequences.
The singular rhetorical ineffectiveness of the Gablers’ reliance upon the
Romantic tropes of childhood, as well as their use of non-religious “generically
accessible language” to attempt to construct a common ground between
themselves and those who did not adhere to their fundamentalist version of
“Judeo-Christian values” exposes the reality that the Gablers and their opponents
disagreed at a much deeper but unarticulated level. In their engagements with
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each other, educators, journalists, and the Gablers tended to take for granted
their own assumptions about the proper aims of education, the inherent
goodness or badness a pluralistic society, and the appropriateness of applying
claims of absolute truth to that society.
Winnifred Sullivan notes that “religion has proved to be not an irrational,
private, and authoritarian premodern relic destined to fade away, but has proved
remarkably vital and ubiquitous, refusing the place assigned it by the modern
consciousness.”207 Fred M. Frohock argues, “It is easy to forget, within the
comfortable landscape of social religions, that the metaphysical and the practical
are fused in a way of life throughout many cultures, and this way of life is
governed not by the social but by a transcendent reality, often configured as
God.”208 Nancy Ammerman insists that for fundamentalists (and their
conservative evangelical relations), religion “is grounded in an institution (the
church) and in a document (the Holy Bible), both of which make the unlikely
claim to ultimate truth. That truth, it is claimed, applies to all individuals and has
preeminence over the claims of all other institutions.”209 Close reading Mel and
Norma Gablers’ largest work suggests reasons why, in conflicts involving the
religious Right, opponents have so often appeared to merely talk past each
other. Deeply concerned about the state of affairs in the United States and in its
207 Sullivan, Impossibility. 152.
208 Fred M. Frohock, Bounded Divinities: Sacred Discourses in Pluralist
Democracies (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 1.
209 “Fundamentalists simply do not accept either the cultural pluralism or
the institutional differentiation that have come to be assumed in the modern
world.” Ammerman, Bible Believers. 3.
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public educational system, yet desiring to participate in a debate whose “arena of
agreement” presumed upon a positive valuing of diversity in its many
manifestations, the Gablers were faced with limited options. They could either
submit their foundational premises as the matter of debate, or they could attempt
to, through a variety of rhetorical techniques, translate their agenda into broadly
persuasive terms. Unfortunately, using non-fundamentalist terms alone merely
shrouded that deeper level of potential disagreement in apparent selfcontradictions and rhetorical confusion. As Sullivan, Frohock, and Ammerman
suggest, the Gablers’ denial of the religiously-partisan character of their
argument stems largely from the fact that they themselves apparently saw no
division between, in Frohock’s terms, the “metaphysical and the practical.” Their
anchoring presupposition regarded their possession of an absolute truth that was
essentially American, they argued, but that, more importantly, was simply right.
To question what was already certain was untenable, a challenge to God
Himself, and to bring that assertion into the realm of open debate would have
been to obliterate the foundation of the very framework that structured the
Gablers’ entire conception of reality - an event whose possibility would unnerve
even the bravest.
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